

# CONCENTRIC CIRCLE STRATEGY IN INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER JOKO WIDODO ADMINISTRATION

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## ABSTRACT

Concentric circle principle has been used as policy guidelines in implementation Indonesia's foreign policy during New Order and after political reformation 1998. The paper discusses relevance of the principle on Indonesian foreign policy during Joko Widodo administration. The paper argues that even though Joko Widodo government put attention on maritime fulcrum and economic diplomacy as part of implementation of foreign policy, concentric circle principle remains important element. This can be seen on the importance Southeast Asia as corner stone of Indonesian foreign policy. In, addition, lately Indonesian is also active promoting Indo Pacific region as a platform of diplomacy and in the same time expanded of concentric circle implementation in Indonesian Foreign Policy.

Keywords: *foreign policy, concentric circle, Indonesia, Joko Widodo*

## 1. BACKGROUND

Principle of concentric circle on Indonesian Foreign Policy has been part of strategy the country's foreign policy. It states that focus of foreign policy based on closer areas toward outer areas in circle concept. It requires that Indonesia put closer area as safe buffer zone for robust development. Consequently, Indonesia maintain peaceful of closer region – Southeast Asia - as a stepping stone for domestic economic and political development. The principle has been proven to Indonesia as one principle to cope regional development.

Concept of concentric circle in Indonesian foreign policy occurred late of 1980s as part of strategy of foreign policy of Indonesia. Formulation of this concept supported by various policy statement from foreign office officials and ranks. This concept put the world as layers geographically from Indonesia in central layer toward external layers begin with southeast Asia, southwest pacific until outset layers such as Africa.

The paper examines implemen-tation of concentric circle in Indonesia's foreign policy including during Jokowi administration. The paper consists of two parts; first it discusses the importance of principle concentric circle in Indonesian foreign policy. Secondly, how Jokowi administration implement and further modification of the principle.

## 2. PRINCIPLE OF CONCENTRIC CIRCLE


Principle of concentric circle in Indonesian foreign policy appear as a formal policy during 1980s discussion when Jakarta established that South-east Asia region is basic foundation for Indonesia in dynamic of the world. Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2003) asserts that a key feature of this foreign policy approach is the "concentric circle" formula. That is, Indonesia will accord a higher priority to relations with regions closest to its own national boundaries, primarily for political and security reasons, though economic considerations have become

increasingly important. By this measure, the top priority foreign policy “circle” is ASEAN, long regarded as the main thrust of Indonesian foreign policy.

According to Anwar maintaining friendly relations with its immediate Southeast Asian neighbors is critical to ensuring Indonesia’s own security, particularly in the border areas. The Megawati Government has also reiterated its interests in maintaining friendly relations with the nations of the South Pacific, particularly with Papua New Guinea, which shares a common border with Indonesia and sea lanes with Australia.

The idea was that instead of pursuing a globalist foreign policy as President Sukarno had done when he tried to position Indonesia as a leading light among the ‘new emerging forces’ confronting colonialism and imperialism, explained by Anwar that President Soeharto would pursue more modest foreign policy goals centered on Indonesia’s needs for security, stability and economic development.

Anwar describes that the concept set up priorities of Indonesian foreign policy based on geographic proximity, with the inner circle encompassing ASEAN. The second circle comprising major neighbouring countries in East Asia, the third circle the wider Asia Pacific region, with the outer perimeters being of diminishing importance. Concentric circle principle can be seen like a figure in below.



**Figure 1 (Setiwan, 2012)**

According to the figure number one to five represent a region begin with Indonesia, Southeast Asia and South-west Pacific, Asia Pacific, Middle East and Africa, Europe and America. Therefore, number represent of priority of Indonesian foreign policy. It is imperative that Indonesia should focus to build closet region of Southeast Asia as basic priority in foreign policy.

According to Juwono Sudarsono (1985) as Setiawan quotes that Indonesian principles of Concentric Circle to set up priority of foreign policy based on diplomacy capability. With this principle as Sudarsono explains it is understandable that resolving Cambodia problem at that time became focus of Indonesian foreign relations.

Fuad Hassan (1984) observes that concentric circle approach as "pattern of priority in international relations. He further explains that "In fact, the two regions are mentioned in one breath in the Guidelines of State Policy formula. Being the direct environment of Indonesia, it is only natural that priority is given to those region (Southeast Asia) of which Indonesia is an integral part".

However, Hassan emphasizes that concentric circle is not implemented as rigid form in foreign policy. Hassan describes that "international trends and events have implication toward national interests or provide opportunity for role of Indonesia. Therefore, concentric circle could be understood as circle of determinant. Determinator here means pattern of circle where Indonesia play a role and participation".

Mochtar Kusumaatmadja includes principle of concentric circle as part of "several principles which influence Indonesia's Foreign Policy. Principles here are Universalism Principle, Regionalism Principle and Domestic Dimension. In further explanation on concentric circle Kusumaatmadja mentions that these principles are tool for analysis international issues with Indonesia in the middle analysis.

At first, according to regional issue, the regions should Indonesia put high concentration are beginning with Southeast Asia, Pacific and Middle East. Secondly, according to economic issue, Indonesia put big attention to set up economic relations with donor countries

which contribute to economic development including ASEAN. At third, according to organization issues, biggest forum in implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy is ASEAN, Non-Aligned, OIC, OPEC, UN and agencies including government and non-government organization. At last, according to political issues, main focus is creating and developing regional stability around Indonesia and the world. It means that Indonesian effort focusing on creating ASEAN solidarity and cooperation, continuing to solve Cambodia problem, set up ZOPFAN and Nuclear Free Zone, supporting cooperation in Pacific region and cooperation with others country which give benefit.

Muhammad Hadianto Wirajuda (2010) recognizes of the importance this approach. He mentions that Indonesia's primary concentric circle emphasized on ASEAN countries, meanwhile the South Pacific, East Asia, and multilateral diplomacy made up the second, third and fourth circles. Hadianto suggest that it is time to redefinition of concentric circle approach in Indonesian foreign policy. He proposes that the concentric circle approach begins with the bold concentration in which area the government wishes to signify, and it should conform with the national strategic interests the administration aims to pursue.

As a note, concentric circle as policy guidance is not implemented by Indonesia only. Some countries apply this principle in formulation and implementation foreign policy. Nigerian foreign policy applies of the concentric circle approach according some perspectives.

Adelusi O.P. quoted Ibrahim A. Gambari (1989) who says that, "a country's foreign policy revolves around its national interests. Nigeria is not and cannot be an exception to this. While Africa remains the center piece of our foreign policy, we cannot operate within a series of concentric circle which now effectively guides our behavior on the African and world scene. The innermost of the circle of national interests involves Nigeria's security- territorial integrity and political independence- and that of the neighbors of Nigeria."

Omotere Tope (2011), as mentions by Adelusi O.P employed the Concentric Circle theory in his seminal work; He posits that, "Analysis of Nigeria's foreign

policy shows that her leaders operate within four "concentric circle" of national interest. The innermost circle represents Nigeria's own security, independence and prosperity and is centered on its immediate neighbors- Benin, Cameroun, Chad and Niger; the second circle revolves around Nigeria's relations with its West African neighbors; the third circle focuses on continental African issues of peace, development and democratization; and the fourth circle involves Nigeria's relations with organizations, institutions and states outside Africa".

This principle is not a theory. It is more logical thinking that a country's foreign policies are like onion rings. The nucleus is the country itself and the outer layers are the souring bigger environments, i.e. bordering countries, regions, bordering regions and global.

Laksmana (2011) argued that this principle has its root on the traditional Javanese concept of Mandala. Original Sanskrit term, 'Mandala' refers to 'circle'. The geometric circle of Mandala was designed to draw attention to its centre (Java). As for foreign policy is concerned, its logic suggests that the center's power diminishes towards the state's periphery. In this regard, Indonesia's geostrategic outlook is represented as a series of concentric circles emanating from Jakarta. The first circle embraces the entire state as defined by the outer limits of its EEZ, the second encompasses the remainder of Southeast Asia and Australia, while the third embraces the remainder of the world.

Further from Indonesian Embassy website in Vienna, there is a statement that in the past, Department of Foreign Affairs put emphasis on diplomatic cooperation with countries that are within a series of concentric circles. The first of the circles is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Just beyond that first circle, Indonesia likewise puts importance to promoting relations with its eastern and southern neighbors, prompting Indonesia to be engaged with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the Southwest Pacific Dialogue, and with the recently established Tri-partite Consultation between Indonesia, Australia and Timor Leste. Also, within the second concentric circle is the ASEAN+3 (the three being Japan, China

and South Korea). Beyond that, Indonesia puts a premium on its relations with the United States and the European Union, both of which are major economic partners of Indonesia.

### 3. JOKOWI'S FOREIGN POLICIES

Entering XXI century, the world politics colors with globalization and the rising China and some major power like India, Japan, and Russia. Making patterns of foreign policy may no longer influence by the distance of foreign actors from the center of gravity. This is due to the fact that some global geostrategic changes may caused more than the changes from Asia-Pacific region.

However, geographical proximity always poses harm with neighboring countries for some conflicting interests like unresolved territorial disputes, conflicting ideologies and claims for greater democratisation being among them. These constraints will determine the dynamics of the security dimension in the Asia-Pacific region in the next millennium.

Indonesian foreign policy has always reckoned with situations within a series of circles in which it plays a geopolitical and geoeconomic role: the world at large, the Asia-Pacific region; the Indian Ocean rim region; the Southwest Pacific, East Asia and Southeast Asia or the ASEAN region. And then, of course, there is the Indonesian domestic situation. Interactions in all of these geographic circles are major factors in the shaping of Indonesian foreign policy, including and especially the Indonesian domestic situation. This thesis suggests that it is the later factor that determines Indonesia's foreign policy aspirations and capability.

At the advent of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century the primacy of domestic context on Indonesia's foreign policy has changed as the outside world has pressed in. Specifically, it resulted from a changing and fluid situation in international affairs and Indonesia's domestic crises, for instance, the Indonesia's economic and political crises since the mid-year of 1997, the East Timor Referendum in 1999 as well as social, economic and political upheavals.

Joko "Jokowi" Widodo administration had announced its vision called Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) on 13 November 2014 in the 9<sup>th</sup> East Asian Summit in Naypyidaw, Myanmar. This vision somehow had many challenges due to no concrete explanation of the vision. Jokowi tended to focus on internal development and assigned his Vice President to attend international visits.

Jokowi did several visits, mainly that related to ASEAN, APEC, and foreign direct investment potential partners like UAE, Saudi Arabia, and many others. It showed the foreign policy pattern has been changed in Jokowi era.

The inner circle always Indonesia and ASEAN, but the following layers are the countries that possess financial and political resources that would be beneficial for Indonesia. Jokowi has tremendous attention to develop Indonesia by constructing infrastructure like transportations, communications, and energy supplies.

Jokowi understood that Indonesia needs foreign investment to boost its economy development, especially in eastern Indonesia. Therefore, his foreign policy is dominated by economy orientation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been revised to be more commercialized by adopting new role as lead advocate for Indonesia's international trade and industries.

However, in Jokowi's second term, the Global Maritime Fulcrum or maritime vision has no longer mentioned in his 2029-2034 vision, namely (1) reforming the bureaucracy, (2) infrastructure development, (3) investment realization, (4) development of human capital, and (5) more efficient use of the state budget. In that vision, only the third vision that has relation with foreign actors. This may be regarded that Jokowi's foreign policy is as simply to gain the most possible foreign direct investments.

That foreign policy option has solid logics. The global economy has been slowing down since 2010. Western Europe and the United States has been through a very low growth rate that limit their foreign investment capabilities. Only China and Japan that show their appetite to expand their investment in developing countries. That situation requires aggressive economic diplomacy

to attract most foreign investment to own countries.

Therefore, the current Indonesia's foreign policy is no longer on geographic orientation, but economic interest. The second concentric circle is still ASEAN countries, as ASEAN is Indonesia's platform to amplify its foreign policy. However the third circle is the deep pocket countries (UAE, Saudi Arabia, China, Norway and Japan). The fourth circle is big export market countries (India, EU, Australia and the USA) and the fifth is thematic countries like energy (from middle east and Australia), weapons system (from Russia and the USA). The last is multilateral diplomacy (NAM and OIC) and the UN.

The above concentric circle is very economic oriented. It has flaw on security issues. Indonesia, like many other countries, has border disputes with at least none countries. The most challenging issue is in overlapping trouble waters between China's claimed nine-dashed-lines and Indonesia's North Natua Sea. During the January 1, 2020 an incident between Indonesia's Navy and Chinese Coast Guard happened that draw Jakarta's concern.

Indonesia's harpower is far below Chinese power. While Indonesia limits itself to not making any security threat because of political believe of free and active foreign politics. Yani and Montratama (2018) claimed that since reformation era, the perception of free and active doctrine has been reduced to simply not making any security alliance, in any situation. However, the perception was not shared by the former political elites in 1945 to 1959 which had variations of the their perceptions.

In 1945-1947, PM Sjahrir did free as free from any kind of colonializations, while active as actively get involved in combating colonialization from the world. In 1947-1948, PM Sjarifuddin did free as not supporting either capitalist nor communist block, while active means the same with PM Sjahrir. In 1948 - 1950, PM Hatta did free as freedom to choose own behavior and becoming subject (not object) in international politics. Hatta deliver a speech that titled *Rowing between Two Rocks* in 1948 and had become the main reference of free and active doctrine. Hatta's interpretation of

active was the same with his predecessors.

In 1950-1953, during the administrations of PM Natsir and PM Soekiman, the active was interpreted as no taking side to the USA nor the Soviet Union, while active was meant as actively participate in striving for peace and ease world tensions. In 1953-1957, PM Ali Sastro interpreted free as developing a balanced relations between both rivaling blocks, while active was interpreted as playing an active role in realizing world peace on the international stage.

In 1957 - 1959, PM Djuanda had revolutionary interpretation of the free and active doctrine. He perceived the doctrine as a bargaining, which is diplomatic efforts to get support from the two Cold War blocks to secure Indonesia's national interests, while as much as possible continue to fight for world peace. This means that Indonesia proactively tried to get close to both sides to pursue its national interest without becoming a member of either side.

During 1945-1959, Indonesia's top priority was security. Indonesia had to fight against the Dutch military aggression, military rebellion and to liberate Papua. Indonesia needs political and weapons supports from both side to leverage its military win the war campaign that had been using modern warfare.

Sukarno become head of executive branch in 1959, after he released Presidential Decree 1959 to replace parliamentary system to be presidential system back as Consitution 1945. As the chief diplomat during 1959 - 1966, Sukarno preliminary perception for free was to balance the two Cold War bloks by not picking any side. However, that perception changed rapidly by establishing a new block that combat neo-colonialism and consisted of four countries, namely Republic of Indonesia, People's Republic of China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Socialist Republic of Vietnam. This new polar was also known as Jakarta-Beijing-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis.

The above axis was more close to communist block as three of the members were communist states and Indonesia had a powerful communist party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) that gained substantial votes from peasants.

Soviet Union supported that axis and proved by their \$ 2 billion soft loan to procure modern weapons systems.

The United States had dilemma to address the axis. On one part, the US had been accused to support rebellion groups (PRRI and Permesta) during 1950 to 1953 and lose Indonesia's trust. On the other part, the US had been participated in Korean War and had to wage another war in IndoChina. It would be critical that the US not getting into another war with Indonesia.

Having clandestine support to Indonesia's rebellion groups was not possible as Indonesian military had been more powerful and had been successful in combating all rebellion group. Washington needed to win Sukarno's heart and mind again to at least not becoming a communist country.

Sukarno had his own agenda to liberate Papua, which was still occupied by the Netherlands. With heavy and modern weapons system from Soviet, Indonesia had become middle power during 1960s. The Dutch military in Papua could not sustain to fight against the mighty Indonesian military. Helping the Dutch in Papua might only escalate the security tension in the region that might open a large proxy war in South East Asia that may include Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Papua.

Sukarno had been able to read the geopolitics carefully and able to liberate Papua without waging big war with the Dutch. His interest then shifted to Malaysia as he thought Malaysia was set up by colonialist and needed to be liberate for its independence. This policy that was known as Konfrontasi, was supported by PKI but not supported by Indonesian Army. Sukarno policies had distracted its economic aspect and making Indonesian economy very fragile.

Having another war, after a non-stop war and conflict since 1945 would make Indonesian people got suffered and might risk for other internal conflicts. Internal political conflict had its climax with the kidnapping of seven Army officers by PKI that ended up with Sukarno step-down in 1966 and abolishment of PKI in Indonesia.

Soeharto became president since 1966 until 1998. He kept the free and active

doctrine. His perception of free was to not picking any Cold War side as he believed it was not appropriate with Indonesian character as reflected in the ideology of Pancasila. While active was perceived as effort to combat imperialism and colonialism in every forms and manifestations. Active also meant to be actively participated in Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the United Nations and ASEAN – but not making NAM as the new block to balance the two Cold War blocks.

Suharto was very focused in domestic economy with main supports from Japan, the US and western European countries. Diplomatic relations with China has been terminated until 1990, while diplomatic relations with Soviet Union were almost non-existence. Soeharto had made communism as Indonesia's biggest threat.

Soeharto had resumed to participate in regional and international forum in 1990. However, he had relied his economic development from foreign loan. A tragic monetary crisis happened in 1997 that made Indonesian economy collapses. Social unrest happened requesting regime change.

In 1998-2014, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid Megawati, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became presidents. Domestic issues were still on top priority as Indonesia needed to recover from crisis. The foreign politics doctrine of free was perceived as not having ties with foreign ideology or politics or security alliance or great powers. While active means actively participated in bilateral strategic partnerships or multilateral forums, namely ASEAN, the UN, ARF, WTO, ADB, World Bank, and others.

During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono or SBY administration, Indonesia followed concentric circle strategy in implementation foreign policy. It is evidence that SBY foreign policy is also put ASEAN as cornerstone of foreign policy strategy. However as a non-aligned state that concentric circle not only one strategy employed by SBY administration. As put by Ulla Fiona etc (2018) that beside concentric circle approach that make ASEAN as prime pillar of diplomacy, SBY add other approach such as "*all directions foreign policy*" and "*a million friends, zero enemies*".

It shows that during SBY administration, concentric circle as strategy for foreign policy implementation was implemented. However, as Fiona mentions that those principles not only one for policy implantation. SBY administrations took larger picture to consolidate Indonesia as middle power and projections to broad issues and geographical meaning

Jokowi has become president since 2014. His interpretation of free was free to determine its policies towards international problems and apart from great power polars. While active meant actively contribute to solving various global issues. However in reality, Jokowi had been focusing his attentions into economic development, especially in eastern Indonesia to push down any disintegration intentions, due to unfair economic development. That intention has a strong reason as the economic development was always centered in Java during New Order era for 32 years.

In Jokowi administration, ASEAN remain unshaking position as important body in foreign policy which make Indonesia in stable conditions and strong leadership. Jokowi's foreign policy not direct to southwest pacific as formulated at concentric circle principles. Indonesia choose Indo Pacific as next area in order to participate in the regional affairs.


This development might be answered at least two perspectives. Firstly, as Indonesia be perceived as middle power there is need to expand its role regionally. Secondly, Indo Pacific become more important in Indonesia international relations due to economic and political reasons. There are two big power in the region: China and India.

From the original concentric circle's strategy, Indonesia would put Southwest Pacific as outer layer to be involved with. It seems that southwest pacific does not give any value added for Indonesia because not growing significantly and non-have impact to the world. In addition, this region is also under sphere of influence Australia.

But in geopolitical perspective, Indonesia more interesting to develop Indo Pacific as inner circle of diplomacy. Without Indonesia's or ASEAN's involvement in Indo Pacific, the mega-region would be fragile for great power rivalry between China and the US. Indonesian interest to involve and participate in the

new region is for maintain peace and security.

Indonesia under Jokowi in various forum state that Indo Pacific should remain source of stability and friendship. Therefore, Indonesia adhere to promote Indo Pacific as a forum multilateral cooperation, not competition given big power such China and India involved.



**Figure 2**

If we draw the concentric circle before Jokowi administration, the illustration would be as figure 2. However, during Jokowi administration, the circles have changed to be as figure 3. Even though, Jokowi's top priority would be similar to Soeharto's, but Jokowi has more flexibilities in targeting the source of foreign direct investments. In Soeharto era, the sources are limited to Japan, the US and western Europe. But Jokowi could engage to China, Middle East, Norway and even Russia.

ASEAN always becomes the second concentric circle in Jokowi administration, for like the previous president, it has two values. **First and foremost** is to maintain peaceful and stability of the region. Southeast Asia was known as region of conflict in 1950s to 1960s. But now, the region was well known for its corporations and solidarity by establishing ASEAN Community in 2015.



**Figure 3**

Anwar (2013) recognizes that although it is no longer explicitly stated, Indonesia has in fact continued its concentric circle foreign policy approach with much national time and energy devoted to the realization of the ASEAN Community by 2015. In addition, Anwar states that "*Beyond ASEAN, priority has been given to relations within the ASEAN +3 (China, Japan and South Korea), the East Asia Summit and APEC. Within these circles it is important to note that, as in the earlier period, concerns for security based on relationships with immediate neighbors predominates; for countries in the outer circle, Indonesia's emphasis is more on securing and safeguarding economic interests.*"

Indeed, in formulation and implementation of foreign policy it is not easy to find principle of concentric circle in Jokowi administration. Concept of maritime fulcrum and economic diplomacy much more popular for public. However, if we focus on more detail, in general principles of concentric circle is implemented in foreign policy.

According to document on foreign policy strategy for five years it could be understood that Southeast Asia region remain corner stone of foreign policy. Based on policy document released by MOFA, aspect leadership in ASEAN remain in top priority. When Indonesia is explained to enhance role and leadership in ASEAN, it states that ASEAN is corner stone and closet concentric circle in Indonesian foreign policy. It is clear that focus in ASEAN in Jokowi foreign policy

remain important as previous government did.

Indonesian leadership in Southeast Asian has shown in attending Jokowi in summit of ASEAN leadership. This send message to neighbor countries that as Indonesia growing become middle power in the region, Southeast Asia remain treated as the closet area in concentric circle strategy. It could be said that treatment of the area might be similar as President Soeharto did when focus in ASEAN in southeast Asia region.

The **second value** is what had mentioned earlier that Indonesia may use ASEAN to amplify its foreign policy aims. This mission has been successful as how ASEAN + forum has become important forum agenda for great power, such as East Asian Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum. ASEAN has been able to link the big three east Asian countries, namely Japan, China and South Korea in ASEAN +3 forum.

In the rising tension over South China Sea dispute, ASEAN has shown its importance by cooling down the tension by promoting ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific. This concept balances the realist concept from the US, Australia, Japan and India that made China inconvenience. Indonesia and ASEAN have principle to avoid the use of force by playing amical methods. Shuttle diplomacies, good office, multi-track diplomacies are common methods to achieve mutually beneficial agreements.

ASEAN has many ways to avoid conflicts and it gets credits for it. However, security is not all what a country need. Country need economic developments and ASEAN has problem to formulate a co-development strategy. The main reasons are all ASEAN members (except Singapore) are developing countries. It is almost impossible to expect co-investments among ASEAN countries. Foreign investments from extramural would be competed among ASEAN countries themselves. It signified by President Jokowi complain on why from 33 Chinese factories that relocated to Southeast Asia in November 2019, none went to Indonesia – while 23 went to Vietnam.

President Jokowi complaint is valid that in ASEAN, all members should unite for the sake of regional peace and stability. However, for economic sector,



all ASEAN members may have to compete each other's. The competition ambience has been crystalized in getting Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments.

Malaysia is the champion in the SE Asia. A single project called Forest City would worth US\$ 100 billion. Forest City project in Johor launched by former Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi in 2006, this economic corridor was created to reignite investor interest in Malaysia. was always seen as the potentially most successful of the five promoted corridors because of its proximity to Singapore (Rahman, 2017).

While for Indonesia, the BRI investments are far below the Malaysian Forest City. At first, Indonesia has Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway that worths US\$ 6 billion, Morowali industrial parks that worth US\$ 6 billion, Sei Mangkei Special Economic Zone in North Sumatra worth US\$ 745 million, alumina smelter in Ketapang, West Kalimantan worths US\$ 1 billion, two projects with total investments \$17.8 billion to build a hydropower plant on the Kayan river, North Kalimantan, an US\$ \$700 million contract to develop facilities to convert coal to dimethyl-ether into gas, a joint venture power development in Bali, worth \$1.6 billion, and a development of steel smelter worth of \$1.2 billion.

To attract more foreign investments, President Jokowi has lead economy diplomacy toward Saudi Arabia and UAE. In April 2019, Jokowi met Saudi's King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. That visit draw Saudi's interest to invest around US\$ 6 billion in the field of fossil energy and tourism. While from UAE, Jokowi on January 2020 had Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed's interest to invest in eleven projects worth US\$ 22,8 billion. The Sheikh has special interest over halal tourism in Indonesia.

The above Jokowi's foreign policies show that Jokowi focused to maintain peace and stability in ASEAN and Indo Pacific, while also pursuing foreign direct investments from deep pocket countries like China, Saudi Arabia, UAE and others.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

Concentric circle approach has always put ASEAN as corner stone of Indonesian diplomacy because as closet area the region require peace and stability. However, with rising tension in the Indo Pacific region, Jokowi's administration expands interpretation of the principle toward on need to develop another layer of Indo Pacific that concern with peace and stability – just like ASEAN. With ASEAN Outlook on Indo Pacific, Indonesia tried hard to avoid armed conflict due to great powers rivalry.

Indonesia's concentric circle on foreign policy may have been shifted from geographic orientation to economic interests in Jokowi administration. This reorientation is very pragmatic as the world economy has been slowing down and Indonesia needs to compete with other countries to attract foreign direct investment to its own country.

That reorientation has flaw in Indonesia's own security aspect. Indonesia foreign policy has not been oriented to develop external balancing with great power(s) to deter any potential security threats against Indonesia. This may inherit Indonesia's foreign policy doctrine of free and active that forbid Indonesia to develop security alliance. This doctrine would make Indonesia rely heavily of softpower – including by ASEAN – as Indonesian hardpower is somehow facing imbalanced threats, if compared with Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA).

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