

**Religious Leaders and Democratic Transition in Post-New Order Indonesia:
A Study on the Role of Muhammadiyah Scholars
in Reducing Radical Islamic Movements**

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ABSTRACT

The fall of the New-Order regime brought Indonesia to democratic transition. Democratic transition in the post-New Order era has brought significant changes to the Indonesian political system. Transition is understood as a phase in which democratization is being established. This period saw an attempt to change the authoritarian system into a democratic one. Many political scientists see democratic transition as a crucial phase. In this phase, people are euphoric with the freedom granted by democratic government. They are learning how to live in a democracy. That is why the transitional period is also marked by extremities. The emergence of radical Islamic movements is one of the phenomena coloring this period in Indonesia.

The rapid growth of radical Islamic movements in democratic transition of post-New Order Indonesia threatens the future of democracy. They attempted to apply *Shari'a* in the state. Even one of these organizations clearly declared that they want to establish Islamic state. Some of Muhammadiyah scholars played important role in countering these radical Islam agendas. These scholars criticized the idea of formalization of sharia. They negotiated salafism with democratic concepts.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After the fall of the New Order (*Orde Baru*) Regime of Indonesia in the middle of 1998, radical Islam movements increased significantly. Several Islamic groups representing political Islam ideas emerged and proposed the formalization of Islamic law (*Shari'a*). They even attempted to establish an Islamic state. Moreover, they did not tolerate diversity.¹ The rapid growth of these radical Islamic movements in Indonesia was an effect of the political turmoil during the period of democratic transition.² Experts such as Liddle and Sorensen state that euphoria and extremity tend to increase at such times.³ At these moments, various movements, either radical or moderate, have an opportunity and the right to express their ideas. In this way, radical Islam groups developed in this period in Indonesia.

Some Muhammadiyah scholars have devoted great attention to the phenomenon of religious radicalism. They were committed to providing guidance during this transitional period and during the process of democratization.⁴ This was reflected in the transitional period in the discourse constructed by Muhammadiyah scholars in newspapers, journals, and books. They criticized radical Islam's ideas. Also, they conducted workshops and conferences to strengthen the role of moderate Islamic groups in stemming the growth of radical Islamic movements. However, the ability of Muhammadiyah scholars to fight radical Islam's ideas was called into question, because Muhammadiyah is associated with puritan and salafi movements. According to Khaled

¹ Jamhari, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (The Radical Salafi Movement in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo/ Rajawali Pers, 2004) p.2-8.

² Baladas Ghoshal. "Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto Indonesia" in *Journal Contemporary Southeast Asia* No.23 (2004) p.506.

³ See William R Liddle, "Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia", in *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesia Islamic Thought* (Edited by Mark R Woodward (Arizona: Arizona State University, 1996) p. 323-356. See also Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993).

⁴ See Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia* (The Islam Syariat Movement: Reproduction of Ideological Salafiyah in Indonesia) (Jakarta: PSAP Muhammadiyah, 2007).

Abou El Fadl, in his book entitled *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*, puritan theology is positively correlated with radical Islam.⁵

The main focus of my thesis is to explore the extent to which Muhammadiyah scholars have been able to counter radical Islamic movements in the period of democratic transition in Indonesia's post-New Order regime. I would especially like to elaborate on Muhammadiyah scholars' ideas regarding the formalization of *Shari'a* and democracy. Moreover, I will also investigate how these scholars negotiate Salafiyya doctrines with democracy.

A. Muhammadiyah scholars and democratic transition

The democratic transition in the post-New Order regime was colored by the emergence of radical Islamic movements.⁶ Muhammadiyah scholars such as Amien Rais, Syafii Ma'arif, Din Syamsuddin, Munir Mulkan, Amin Abdullah, Dawam Rahardjo, Syafii Anwar, and Moeslim Abdurrahman have played an important role in halting the spread of radical Islamic ideas within Indonesian society.⁷ The fact that these scholars all held positions on the board of Muhammadiyah gave them a chance to articulate progressive ideas related to issues of Islam and democracy. They criticized the conservative and radical Islamic thought promoted by radical Islamic organizations. For instance, according to Ahmad Syafii Maarif, radical Islam's ideas have no future in Indonesia.⁸ Maarif believes such ideas disturb the concept of the modern nation state which accommodates diversity and plurality. Maarif said that the idea of an Islamic caliphate, for example, would destroy Indonesia as a nation and democracy as well. Furthermore, Maarif stated that the implementation of *shari'a*, as promoted by radical Islamic

⁵ See Khaled Abou el Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: Harper Sanfransisco, 2005).

⁶ Baladas Ghoshal. "Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-Soeharto Indonesia" in *Journal Contemporary Southeast Asia* No.23 (2004).

⁷ See M Hilaly Basya, *The Role of Young Religious Leaders of Muhammadiyah in Reducing Radicalism in Indonesia* (unpublished paper presented in International Conference, held by Leiden University and Departmen of Religious Affair in Malang-Indonesia on November 26-29, 2007).

⁸ See Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "Banyak Kelompok Lebih Tertarik ke Simbol, Bukan Substansi" (Many Islamic Groups are more Interested in Symbol, not Substance), Interview in *Gatra* No.36, 5 November 2001.

organizations, would also hinder democracy and *Pancasila*.⁹ To date, Indonesia has adopted neither a secular state nor a theocratic state; in fact, there is freedom of religion with all followers of any faith free to practice their beliefs.¹⁰ However, the religions are separated from the state. The government ‘objectifies’¹¹ religious values in order to make them fit within an Indonesian context.¹²

Muhammadiyah scholars countered the influence of radical ideas by writing books and articles published by journals, national newspapers and magazines, as well as conducting seminars and workshops attended by Muslim thinkers and leaders (*ulama*).¹³ Moreover, they introduced the term *Islam rahmatan lil alamin* (Islam as a peaceful message for all people) and the concept of moderate Islam. Together with NU scholars, Muhammadiyah scholars fought against the idea of implementing state *shari’a*. In 2000, a number of movements appeared in parliament, supported by some Islamic parties and Islamic social organizations, calling for a revival of ‘the seven words’¹⁴ of the Jakarta Charter which demands the implementation of *shari’a* for Muslim society.¹⁵ Muhammadiyah scholars believed such a demand would disturb plurality and the concept of the modern nation state. For this reason, they countered the movements by asserting that Indonesian Muslim society does not need to revive ‘the seven words’. Furthermore, they said that Islam should be implemented culturally, and the doctrines have to be objectified.¹⁶ In this case, objectification refers to the interpretation of Islamic doctrines

⁹ See Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Banyak Kelompok Lebih Tertarik ke Simbol, Bukan Substansi” (Many Islamic Groups are more Interested in Symbol, not Substance).

¹⁰ See Nurcholish Madjid, *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Contextualizing Islamic Doctrines in History) (Jakarta: Yayasan Paramadina, 1995). See M Hilaly Basya, “Civil Religion dan Agama Publik” (Civil Religion and Public Religion), in *Media Indonesia*, Juli 2007.

¹¹ The concept of objectification is adopted from Kuntowijoyo, *Identitas Politik Umat Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 1997). Objectification is meant by Kuntowijoyo as a process to transform Islamic teachings to be compatible with modern Indonesian state, so that Indonesian people accept the substance of Islam as universal values. This concept offers Indonesian Muslim leaders to rationalize and secularize Islamic doctrines.

¹² See Nurcholish Madjid, *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Contextualizing Islamic Doctrines in History).

¹³ See M Hilaly Basya, *Moderate Islam, Diversity, and Radicalism in Indonesia* (unpublished paper presented in Bilateral Symposium held by Toronto University, Canada, April 2008).

¹⁴ The seven words are referred to the words “obligation to carry out *shari’a* for adherents of Islam”.

¹⁵ Nadirsyah Hosen, “Religion and The Indonesia Constitution: a Recent Debate”, in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 36 (3) 2005, p.421-427.

¹⁶ See Syafii Maarif, “Demi Keutuhan Bangsa” (for the Integration of Nation) in *Republika* newspaper, 11 July 2006. See Haedar Nashir (interview) “*Gerakan Formalisasi Syariat tak ada Matinya*” (The Shari’a Formalization Movements never Die) in islamlib.com/id/page/.php?page=article&id=1281. See Din

within an Indonesian context in order that they are relevant to Indonesian conditions. As a result, people no longer view them as Islamic doctrines.¹⁷

Muhammadiyah scholars also promoted tolerance.¹⁸ They believed tolerance to be the key in the establishment and strengthening of democracy. Moreover, they believed that the violence utilized by some radical Islamic organizations in articulating and expressing their ideas to be incompatible with democracy.¹⁹ These scholars assessed that intolerance and violence would create insecurity and frighten people who have different opinions to those belonging to radical Islamic organizations.²⁰ The terrorist bombings carried out by *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (JI) activists are one example of the violent tactics adopted by some radical Islamic movements. They use bombs to force people or the government to meet their demands. Generally, however, victims of terror are innocent people who are not involved with the problem. Furthermore, radical Islamic notions – such as the infidels are the Muslim's enemy, and Muslims are allowed to kill non-Muslims – have an impact on the conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims (Christians).²¹ Although economic and political problems are the dominant factors stimulating the conflict, religious identity and exclusive theology have contributed significantly to the increased tensions.²² This was demonstrated by recent clashes in the Moluccas, in which Muslims and Christians were pitched against each other.

Outside of the Muhammadiyah organization, Muhammadiyah scholars also established institutions that promoted progressive ideas. Syafii Maarif initiated the Maarif

Syamsuddin (Interview), "Dari Nekolim hingga Syariat Islam" (From Nekolim to Shari'a) in *Rakyat Merdeka*, 17 December 2006, www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/ediscetak/?pilih=lihat&id=28654. Din Syamsuddin (interview), Leiden, November 07, 2009.

¹⁷ See Kuntowijoyo, *Identitas Politik Umat Islam* (The Political Identity of Muslims) (Bandung: Mizan, 1997) p.65-70

¹⁸ See Saiful Mujani, *Muslim Demokrat: Islam, Budaya Demokrasi, dan Partisipasi Politik di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* (Democrat Muslims: Islam, the Culture of Democracy, and Political Participation in Indonesia after the New Order) (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2007) p.174.

¹⁹ See Syafii Maarif, "Kalau Beragama Secara Hitam Putih, Mungkin Lebih Baik Menjadi Ateis" (It is better to be an Atheist than Puritan and Radical) in voa-islam.com/news/features/2009/10/22/1479

²⁰ Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia* (Jakarta: the Wahid Institute, 2009).

²¹ See Azyumardi Azra, "An Islamic Perspective of Religious Pluralism" in *Indonesia: The Impact of Democracy on Conflict Resolution in Religious Pluralism in Democratic Societies* (Singapore: Konrad Adenaur Stiftung, 2007).

²² See Azyumardi Azra, "An Islamic Perspective of Religious Pluralism". See M Hilaly Basya, "Inklusifisme dan Islam Moderat (Inclusivism and Moderate Islam), in Tarmizi Taher, *Pluralisme Islam: Harmonisasi Beragama* (Islamic Pluralism: The Harmonization of Religions) (Jakarta, Karsa Rezeki, 2004).

Institute, Moeslim Abdurrahman commenced the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (JIMM) and the al-Ma'un Foundation, Din Syamsuddin and Abdul Mu'ti established the Center for Dialog and Cooperation among Civilizations (CDCC), Pramono U Tanthowi and Sukidi founded the Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization (PSAP), Syafii Anwar initiated the International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), and Tarmizi Taher and Syafii Maarif created the Center for Moderate Muslim (CMM).²³ These institutions culturally advocate pluralism, democracy, and humanity. Moreover, they seek to strengthen democracy based on Islamic doctrines.

Together with other Muslim scholars, the role of these Muhammadiyah scholars in guiding the democratic transition and the processes of democratization is significant since radical Islamic movements that demand the establishment of a theocracy use Islamic doctrines to attract Muslims.²⁴ Generally, radical Islam activists view the secular system implemented by the New Order regime as a failure in terms of maintaining the country. They point to the economic crisis that happened at the end of 1990s as evidence of this failure.²⁵ Although the followers of radical Islam are not significant quantitatively, their propaganda is disseminated intensively and widely by mass media. As a result, radical Islamic movements have attracted national and even international attention and support. To some extent, the social and political conditions at this time were similar to those in period of the Old Order in which Islamic parties and organizations demanded that the government implement *shari'a* and revive 'the seven words' of the Jakarta Charter.

In general Muhammadiyah scholars have two strategies – political and cultural – for fighting against radical Islam movements. Although Muhammadiyah has not established a political party, it is used to lobbying parliament and government. Moreover, most constituents of the National Duty Party (PAN) are also Muhammadiyah members. In addition, the chairperson of PAN at that time was the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, Professor Amin Rais. This helped Muhammadiyah scholars to influence

²³ Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam: the Conservative-Progressive Debate within Muhammadiyah*, Unpublished Thesis (Canberra: Australian National University, 2007) p.100-101.

²⁴ Saiful Mujani, *Muslim Demokrat* (Democrat Muslims), p.174.

²⁵ See "Ormas Islam Demo MPR" (Islamic Organizations Initiated Public Demonstration to MPR) in *Tempo newspaper*. 15/08/2000.

the parliament and government to control radical Islam's agendas.²⁶ Principally, Muhammadiyah is part of civil society and has many programs related to training and education.²⁷ This cultural strategy is the main approach adopted by Muhammadiyah scholars and they use seminars and workshops to criticize radical Islamic ideas. The aim of these activities is to reach a wide audience and involve as many Muhammadiyah and other organization leaders as possible to counter radical Islam ideas.

Undeniably, there is heated debate between the conservative and progressive wings of Muhammadiyah. The conservatives say that the progressive scholars have moved Muhammadiyah towards liberal Islam.²⁸ For years, this conservative wing represented a puritan orientation, tending to derive what they imagine to be true Islamic rituals from local customs. Moreover, the conservatives criticized modern thoughts introduced by progressive Muslim thinkers such as Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Abdullahi Ahmed an-Naim, Hasan Hanafi, and Ali Abdul Raziq. This critique and resistant discourse is one of the main obstacles faced by progressive Muhammadiyah scholars. However, it did not stop their fight against radical Islam's actions.

B. Significance of the study

Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim-majority nation. After the fall of the New Order regime (*rezim Orde Baru*) the country faced a democratization process. Experts call this process the democratic transition. This period culminated in freedom for Indonesian people. However, the transitional period was also used by radical Islamic groups to pursue their ideals which are not compatible with democracy.²⁹ Their movement could affect the future of democracy and the ideas they promote would diminish the democratic sphere.

The success of the democratic transition, more and less, is influenced by Muslim society in Indonesia. Muslims are better equipped to counter radical Islam's ideas. The

²⁶ See Saiful Mujani, "Politik Tujuh Kata" (the Politics of Seven Words) in *Tempo* newspaper 31 July 2002. See "Pasal 29 UUD 1945 Tidak akan Diubah" in www.gatra.com/2002-02-29/artikel.php. See Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (The Islam Syariat Movement).

²⁷ Pramono U Tanthowi, *Muslim Civil Society and Democratization: The Case of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, (unpublished Thesis, Hawai, 2008) p.129-189.

²⁸ Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam*, p.1-2.

²⁹ Bima Arya Sugiarto, *Agama, Politik Identitas, dan Kekerasan* (Religion, Politics of Identity, and Violence) (unpublished paper presented at Muhammadiyah University Jakarta, 21 March 2007).

role of Muhammadiyah scholars in fighting against radical Islam movements contributes to the democratization process. The critical response of Muhammadiyah scholars to radical Islam ideas reflects their responsibility and commitment to the establishment of democracy in Indonesia.³⁰

For these Muhammadiyah scholars if democracy is to flourish, then the growth of radical Islam must be halted. Radical Islamic groups criticize democracy and intend to replace it with a theocracy – an Islamic caliphate. Gaining an understanding of how Muhammadiyah scholars fought against forms of radical Islam will contribute to improving the processes of democracy and foster a harmonious life in Indonesia. Furthermore, the study will be a significant addition to the literatures that highlight Muhammadiyah scholars' ideas and movements, and the implications of these on social-political life. It is widely accepted that Muhammadiyah scholars adopted Salafiyya doctrines, so it is interesting to study how they recontextualized and reconstructed Salafiyya, and how they overcame and countered radical Islam's ideas.

C. Scope of the study

The focus of this study covers the role of Muhammadiyah scholars in fighting against radical Islamic ideas and movements, their ideas on the formalization of *shari'a* and democracy, and how they dealt with Salafiyya and democracy. The study is limited to the ideas and actions that were undertaken to counter radical Islamic groups. To date, Muhammadiyah scholars have criticized the concept of an Islamic caliphate, the implementation of *sharia*, and the concept of *jihad* against infidels. These debates will be explored and elaborated. Moreover, Muhammadiyah's actions in the political dimension, as seen in the parliamentary debates on the amendment of article 29 of UUD 1945³¹ in the years 2000, 2001, 2002, will also be studied. Muhammadiyah scholars supported 'Islamic' and 'secular' parties in order to defend the original text of article 29. This action is significant in the prevention of the establishment of theocracy in Indonesia.

This study will also explore various forms of Salafiyya and the relationship between radical Islam, the salafi movement, and democracy. The emergence of several

³⁰ Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (The Islam Syariat Movement).

³¹ The article 29 of UUD 1945 explains about religious freedom of Indonesian people.

radical Islamic organizations after the fall of the New Order brought about ideas of an Islamic caliphate, the formalization of *shari'a*, war against infidels, as well as religious violence and intolerance. These organizations claimed to be salafi movements. However, it is important to note that the Muhammadiyah scholars who countered these radical Islamic movements believe themselves to be followers of salafiyya as well.

D. Research objectives

This research has three main purposes:

1. To explore the role of Muhammadiyah scholars in countering radical Islamic movements in Indonesia.
2. To elaborate Muhammadiyah scholars' ideas on the formalization of *shari'a* and democracy.
3. To investigate the way Muhammadiyah Scholars dealt with Salafism doctrines and democracy.

E. Literature review

Several studies have been written about Muhammadiyah, covering various aspects including Islamic thought, Islamic law, Islamic theology, politics and history. Alfian's study, entitled *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behaviour of a Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism* (1969), elaborates about Muhammadiyah behavior as Islam-based organization during Dutch colonialism. Alfian found that although Muhammadiyah is committed with non-political movement, its figures and activists are aware and care with Indonesian political condition. However this study did not explore the character of salafi in Muhammadiyah or the recent progress of the Muhammadiyah scholars' role in democratization.

M Sirajudin Syamsuddin's work entitled *Religion and Politics in Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order* (1991) is very helpful in understanding the political role of Muhammadiyah during the New Order regime. Unfortunately Syamsuddin omitted to investigate the forms of salafiyya and Islamic thoughts present within Muhammadiyah. A similar case is also found in Saifullah's work entitled *Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi* ('Muhammadiyah's Political Movements within

Masyumi'). This work only elaborated on the political role of Muhammadiyah within Masyumi. I suggest that it would be useful to investigate further the various forms of Salafiyya and Islamic thought in order to see if there is any correlation between these and the development of Muhammadiyah and its support for democracy.

Arbiyah Lubis' work, *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah dan Muhammad Abduh: Suatu Studi Perbandingan* ('Muhammadiyah's and Muhammad Abduh's Thought: A Comparative Study') (1993) provides details of the type of Islamic thought found within Muhammadiyah and specifically, Lubis explores the influence of Abduh's ideas on Muhammadiyah. However, Lubis makes no attempt to examine the influence of Salafiyya on Muhammadiyah or investigate any relationship it may have with Muhammadiyah's social and political tendencies. Furthermore, Boy Pradana presents the recent debate between the conservative and progressive wings of Muhammadiyah in his work entitled *In Defense of Pure Islam: the Conservative-Progressive Debate within Muhammadiyah* (2007). Again, this study fails to examine the development of salafiyya in Muhammadiyah.

Aside from these works, there are also several important studies on Muhammadiyah relating to the emergence of liberal thought, including a book written by Syamsul Hidayat and Sudarno Shobron (eds), *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons Terhadap Liberalisasi Islam* ('Muhammadiyah's Thought: Response to the Liberalization of Islam'), Imron Nasri (eds), *Pluralisme dan Liberalisme: Pergolakan Pemikiran anak Muda Muhammadiyah* ('Pluralism and Liberalism: the Dynamic of Muhammadiyah's Young Generation's Thought'), Moeslim Abdurrahman, *Muhammadiyah sebagai Tenda Kultural* ('Muhammadiyah as Cultural Tent'). Again, however, these works do not explore the dynamic of salafiyya in Muhammadiyah and its impact on the role of Muhammadiyah scholars in democratization.

F. Method

This research uses qualitative methods. It relies on the interpretation of events and discourses that occurred during the democratic transition in Indonesia. The analysis draws on research about the role of some Muhammadiyah scholars in fighting against radical Islamic movements. This research consists of theoretical overviews and empirical

investigations. The theoretical overview starts with bibliographical research. This is done by reviewing relevant books, articles, papers and academic works. The literature review provides a conceptual framework for this research. Empirical investigations have been undertaken using books, magazines, newspapers, leaflets, websites, and interviews.

Using this approach, the research entails library studies on salafi movements, especially on Muhammadiyah and its contribution to democratization. A great deal of literature has been written by scholars about the issue. The research also observes events and discourses related to the involvement of Muhammadiyah scholars in fighting against radical Islam's ideas.

This study highlights the views and role of Muhammadiyah scholars and their important role during the democratic transitional period in fighting radical Islamic ideas and promoting progressive Islamic ideas. It demonstrates that the importance of Muhammadiyah in strengthening democracy.

The study also examines the influence of social, political and cultural factors on Muhammadiyah scholar's thought. It is interesting to examine the extent to which these scholars' interaction with modernism affected their movement. To date, Muhammadiyah is perceived as a salafi movement. Yet, to some extent, some Muhammadiyah scholars show different characteristics to other salafi. It is necessary, then, to understand what the factors are behind this. In this regard, the research describes the genealogy and development of salafi movements in the Islamic world, and goes on to identify and classify these salafi movements.

G. Thesis structure

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter one has been devoted to establishing the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the study. It reviews the discourse of Muhammadiyah scholars, the democratic transition in post-New Order Indonesia, and radical Islam. In addition, it explains the significance of this study.

Chapter two will explore the social and political conditions of democratic transition in post-New Order Indonesia. Radical Islamic movements will be portrayed as a challenge and an obstacle to democratic transition. Moreover, it examines the notion that the emergence of radical Islam is a consequence of the transitional period itself.

Chapter three will investigate the relation between Muhammadiyah scholars and salafi movements. Subsequently, I will examine the shift of salafi movements towards radical Islam. Chapter four portrays the role of Muhammadiyah scholars' in reducing radical Islamic movements and how these scholars dealt with salafiyya doctrines and democracy. Chapter five is the concluding chapter and will analyze the various forms of salafi, and the character of salafi within Muhammadiyah, as well as recapitulating the way Muhammadiyah scholars deal with salafiyya and democracy.

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN THE POST-NEW ORDER AND RADICAL ISLAM

Democratic transition in the post-New Order era has brought significant changes to the Indonesian political system. Transition is understood as a phase in which democratization is being established.¹ This period saw an attempt to change the authoritarian system into a democratic one. Many political scientists, such as Huntington, O'Donnell, Diamond, and Liddle, see democratic transition as a crucial phase.² In this phase, people are euphoric with the freedom granted by democratic government. They are learning how to live in a democracy. That is why the transitional period is also marked by extremities. The emergence of radical Islamic movements is one of the phenomena coloring this period in Indonesia.³ This chapter will explore the social and political conditions in the period of democratic transition in post-New Order Indonesia, and the emergence of radical Islamic movements which challenge the future of democracy.

A. Democratic transition

The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 marked the beginning of the transitional period of democracy in Indonesia.⁴ Change came not via a coup, but via demands from the Indonesian people for a new regime and a change in the country's political and economic system. The economic crisis which occurred in was a catalyst for political crisis. The people believed the authoritarian political system was the cause of the economic crisis and they believed democracy to be the solution. *Reformasi* (reformation) is the term used

¹ See Guillermo O'Donnell, et.al. *Transition from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 1986).

² See Samuel P Huntington, *the Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). See Guillermo O'Donnell, et.al. *Transition from Authoritarian Rule*. See William R Liddle, "Indonesia's Threefold Crisis" in *Journal of Democracy* vol.3, No.4, October 1992. See Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore and London: the John Hopkins University Press, 1999).

³ William R Liddle, "Indonesia's Threefold Crisis" in *Journal of Democracy* vol.3, No.4, October 1992

⁴ Syamsuddin Haris, *Konflik Presiden-DPR dan Dilema Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia* (The Conflict of President-DPR and Dilemma of Democratic Transition in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Grafiti, 2007) p.25-29.

by the people to describe the change in the existing system.⁵ Political scientist Syamsuddin Haris says that the people used reformation to call for President Suharto and his allies to go.⁶ In other words, mass action and people power in 1998 attempted to replace the New Order regime.

Democratic transition has brought significant political and social changes to Indonesia.⁷ On taking power, the *Reformasi* government⁸ revised old regulations concerning political and social organizations. These new regulations provided the rights and freedom for people to establish political parties and social organizations. The government argued that such a freedom is the people's right and that the state has to protect this right.

Furthermore, critical opposition to the state was no longer prohibited. This was one of the most significant shifts to occur in the Indonesian political sphere. It was in stark contrast to the previous regime. During the New Order (1966-1998), people who were critical of the government were imprisoned. The regime argued that critical movements would endanger stability and security; two things it said were important and necessary to establish economic growth. Contrary to the previous regime, the reformation government believes that opposition fosters a transparent and accountable government. Critical opposition is also seen as the representation of the people's sovereignty. It is a principle foundation of a democratic system.⁹

The notion of *Pancasila*¹⁰ as the sole ideology of political and social organizations was also abolished. Some political parties established in the transitional period, such as the Justice Party (PK), the Star Crescent Party (PBB), and the Muslims' Party (PUI), declared Islam as their ideology. The United Development Party (PPP) which was established in the New Order also changed its guiding principle to Islam.

⁵ Syamsuddin Haris, *Konflik Presiden-DPR dan Dilema Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia* (The Conflict of President-DPR and Dilemma of Democratic Transition in Indonesia), p.27-30.

⁶ Syamsuddin Haris, *Konflik Presiden-DPR dan Dilema Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia* (The Conflict of President-DPR and Dilemma of Democratic Transition in Indonesia), p.27-30.

⁷ See Deny J.A, *Jatuhnya Soeharto dan Transisi Demokrasi Indonesia* (The Fall of Soeharto and Democratic Transition) (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2006).

⁸ Bacharudin Jusuf Habibe was the President of *Reformasi* cabinet (1998-1999).

⁹ See Syamsuddin Haris, *Konflik Presiden-DPR dan Dilema Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia* (The Conflict of President-DPR and Dilemma of Democratic Transition in Indonesia).

¹⁰ *Pancasila* (five principles) is a national ideology of Indonesia that was formulated since couple days before Indonesian independence (1945). This ideology is comprised of Indonesian religious values and traditions.

Islamic social organizations such as the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and Muhammadiyah also amended their ideology along Islam lines.¹¹ This new regulation allowing for the freedom of association has had a significant impact on the social and political conditions in Indonesia. The state no longer dominates and represses the public and political sphere. People are free to express their ideological ideas. Generally, democratic transition provides the conditions for the consolidation of democracy.¹²

On the other hand, democratic transition brought uncertainty in certain political and social aspects.¹³ Since democratization could not be implemented comprehensively in one step, it would be established gradually.¹⁴ Furthermore, people have to adjust to the new atmosphere created by a democratic system. This is reflected in the ideological and religious polarization in politics which occurred soon after democratization began. In the first general election of democratic transitional period in 1999, Islamic political parties campaigned not to vote for a presidential candidate who would not commit to Islamic political interests. Cees van Dijk describes this as a consequence of the critical opposition expressed by nationalist political parties represented by the Struggle Indonesian Democratic Party (PDIP) and leftist movements represented by intellectuals and activists to the President Habibie.¹⁵ While a minister and Vice President in the New Order, Habibie's close relations with Islamic factions was well known. As a result, Islamic factions interpreted critical opposition to Habibie as an attack on Islamic interests.¹⁶

Generally, there are two reasons behind the movements critical of Habibie: Firstly, after Suharto's resignation, the critics had hoped that power would be given to the people, and that the people would determine the president and design the new political

¹¹ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Soeharto" in *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities*, Vol.1, 2008, p.31-32

¹² See Syamsuddin Haris, *Konflik Presiden-DPR dan Dilema Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia* (The Conflict of President-DPR and Dilemma of Democratic Transition in Indonesia).

¹³ See Guillermo O'Donnell, et.al. *Transition from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 1986).

¹⁴ See Carsten Q. Schneider, *the Consolidation of Democracy: Comparing Europe and Latin America*, Routledge, 2009.

¹⁵ See Cees Van Dijk, *A Country in Despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 2000* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001).

¹⁶ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Soeharto", p.30.

system. Secondly, Habibie was seen as part of the New Order regime and would simply extend and represent the same regime.¹⁷

On the other hand, Islamic factions saw that the process of power exchange was on the right track.¹⁸ To some extent, the political configuration had shown that there was ideological polarization, namely between *santri* and *abangan*. These terms are adopted from Clifford Geertz. Geertz observed, especially in Java, that there were political contestations between *santri* and *abangan*. *Santri* is defined by Geertz as Muslims who are committed to pure Islam, and intend to fight for Islamic political interests. *Abangan* is a term used for Muslims who practice a syncretic form of Islam. They mix Islamic rites with local practices (animism). Moreover, *abangan* tend to join nationalist secular political parties.¹⁹

The shift in political configuration, which occurred after the fall of the New Order, indicated that political parties, civil society, and the state were attempting to find a new equilibrium. The emergence of ideological polarization was an indication of the people's attempt to adjust to democracy.²⁰

Extreme situations also colored the democratic transition.²¹ The government allowed people to articulate any ideas, because democracy provides for the freedom of expression for people. The consequence of this was that socialist and communist literatures were no longer restricted. People were free to learn and speak about these ideas. There were movements attempting to look critically at the neo-Liberalism which characterized the Indonesian government in the New Order regime. These critical studies examined the weakness and failure of neo-Liberalist ideas, and they offered up socialism as the solution.

There were also attempts to re-establish an authoritarian political system and revive the military regime.²² Ethnic and religious conflicts were taking place in some

¹⁷ Syamsuddin Haris, *Konflik Presiden-DPR dan Dilema Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia* (The Conflict of President-DPR and Dilemma of Democratic Transition in Indonesia), p.30.

¹⁸ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Soeharto", p.29.

¹⁹ See Clifford Geertz, *Religion of Java* (Glencoe: the Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

²⁰ See Carsten Q. Schneider, *the Consolidation of Democracy*.

²¹ Deny J.A, *Jatuhnya Soeharto dan Transisi Demokrasi Indonesia* (The Fall of Soeharto and Democratic Transition), p.28. See Guillermo O'Donnell, et.al. *Transition from Authoritarian Rule*.

²² Siddharth Chandra and Douglas Kammen, "Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military Politics in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and Consolidation" in *Journal of World Politics* 55, October 2002, p.101-105.

Indonesian regions and these were used as an argument to strengthen the role of the military in the political dimension.²³ In fact, the transitional government at this time attempted to reform the position of the military. As in other democratic countries, they believed the military should be separate from the political domain. Experience demonstrated that military engagement in politics threatens democracy.

The transitional period was crucial. It was a period that could lead to a consolidated democracy or see a return of an authoritarian system.²⁴ Another challenging situation was the emergence of radical Islamic groups promoting *shari'a* and an Islamic political system. These radical Islamic organizations fought for the establishment of Islamic laws in the state. They believed that the economic and political crisis of 1998 was caused by a secular system. The crisis was seen as God's warning that Indonesia should totally change its political and economic system. Certainly, these radical Islamic movements had the potential to replace democracy with an Islamic system (theocracy).

This thesis will focus on how Muhammadiyah scholars countered radical Islam's ideas, and for this reason I will not elaborate on all of the extremities which emerged during the transitional period. Instead, I will limit my study to the challenge radical Islam poses for democratic transition.

B. Radical Islam

The term 'radical Islam' refers to Muslims who do not tolerate diverse interpretations of Islamic teachings, who allow violent approaches to people or groups that are assumed to be enemies of Islam, and who fight for the establishment of an Islamic system in the political and social space.²⁵ These kind of Islamic movements emerged rapidly during the transitional period.²⁶ *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), Defender Front of Islam (FPI), Communication Forum of *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah* (FKAWJ), and Hizbut Tahrir

²³ Syamsuddin Haris, *Konflik Presiden-DPR dan Dilema Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia* (The Conflict of President-DPR and Dilemma of Democratic Transition in Indonesia), p.156-163. See Carsten Q. Schneider, *the Consolidation of Democracy*.

²⁴ See Guillermo O'Donnell, et.al. *Transition from Authoritarian Rule*.

²⁵ Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.) *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia), p.2-8.

²⁶ Piers Gillespie, "Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwa No.7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism, and Secularism" in *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 2007, p.3-4. John Bowen, *Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p.5.

Indonesia (HTI) are all classified as radical Islam organizations. These organizations emerged at the beginning of Indonesian democratization and played a significant role in promoting *shari'a* as the solution for the crisis.

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) was inaugurated on August 2009. The most prominent figure within MMI is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.²⁷ The New Order regime had proscribed him as a dangerous person as a result of his ideas criticizing the government as secular and anti-Islam. Ba'asyir spent several years in exile in Malaysia during the Suharto regime. He returned to Indonesia after the fall of the New Order and, together with his colleagues, established MMI.²⁸

MMI's founders declared that it was the continuity of Islamic State movements (DI/TII), which had been the Islamic movement's attempt to establish an Islamic state during the Old Order regime.²⁹ Some of those joining MMI had been DI/TII activists in several Indonesian regions. In fact, the founders of MMI had intended it to be the coalition movement of Muslims fighting for an Islamic state.³⁰ The main agenda of MMI was to establish *shari'a* in the social and political spheres. They argued that democracy was not Islamic. Furthermore, democracy is seen as a western and secular product that is not an appropriate system for Muslims.³¹ MMI rejected democracy. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the chairman of MMI, clearly states that democracy is *thoghut* (negative social and political attitude prohibited by God). Democracy originates from infidel values and is incompatible with Islam. According to Ba'asyir, Muslims need and must apply Islamic systems.³²

²⁷ See *Mengenal Majelis Mujahidin* (Brief Explanation about Majelis Mujahidin) (Yogyakarta: Markaz Pusat Majelis Mujahidin, 1999), p.15.

²⁸ Farish A. Noor, *Defining Islam: Pesantrens, Educational Networks and Politics in the Determination of Meaning in the Muslim Space of Indonesia Today*, p.4-7 (the article can be downloaded from [www.isis.org.my/files/pubs/papers/Defining Islam.pdf](http://www.isis.org.my/files/pubs/papers/Defining%20Islam.pdf). Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, (eds.) *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia). p.48-67.

²⁹ Marteen Van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia" in *Journal of South East Asia Research*, vol.10, No.2 p.127-130.

³⁰ Nadirsyah Hosen, "Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate" in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 36 (3), 2005, p.425. Jajang Jahroni, "Islamic Fundamentalism in Contemporary Indonesia" in *Journal of Refleksi*, Vol. IV, No.1, 2002, p.42. Documents from the Kongres Mujahidin (Yogyakarta, 5-7 August, 2000) are available at <http://www.geocities.com/kongresmujahidin/>.

³¹ See Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. "Sistem Kaderisasi Mujahidin dalam Mewujudkan Masyarakat Islam" (Training System of Mujahidin in Establishing Islamic Society) in *Sabili*, No.5, 2000. Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds), *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia), p.75-77.

³² See Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, *Catatan dari Penjara: Mengamalkan dan Menegakkan Dinul Islam* (Notes from a Prison: Implementing and Establishing Islam) (Depok: Mushaf, 2006).

MMI used social and political approaches to establish their agenda. They promoted *shari'a* by campaigning for it in the public sphere through mass media, internet, and books. They also lobbied Islamic political parties to revive the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*).³³ Moreover, MMI held seminars on campuses and in mosques about the requirements for implementing state *shari'a*.

In addition, Indonesian and western governments assume that MMI has connections with international terrorist movements. Judicial proceedings in Indonesia revealed that those responsible for the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2003 had close connections to Ba'asyir.³⁴ The Indonesia government believes that MMI propagates the idea of *Jihad*, which means waging war against infidels, particularly those who come from western countries. Generally, terrorism is seen as an ideology developing in insecure countries in which people are in conflict. Bombings create political instability.³⁵ This tactic is often used by groups in an attempt to pressure governments to accept their demands.³⁶ It is also a medium which sends a message. In the case of the Bali bombings, terrorists wanted to warn the American government and its allies to stop their attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan.³⁷ Most of the bombings which occurred in Indonesia in the transitional period were designed to impact western countries in some way. The targets were the symbols of western states such as America, the United Kingdom and Australia, or the places in which western people gathered.

Although MMI has no direct connection with those terrorists hijacking Islam, MMI is believed to propagate the idea of war against western countries. MMI interprets *jihad* as the fundamental teaching of Islam that calls Muslims to wage war on their enemies, especially when Muslims are attacked by them.³⁸ The recent international political situation in places such as Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan are assessed by MMI as Muslims being attacked by the enemy. MMI often stated publicly that America and its

³³ Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.) (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia), p.82-84.

³⁴ See <http://www2.kompas.com/utama/news/0503>

³⁵ Jean-Francois Mayer, "Cults, Violence, and Religious Terrorism: An International Perspective" in *Journal of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 2001, p.361.

³⁶ Zeynep Sutan, "Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism" in *Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), p.13.

³⁷ See *Kompas* newspaper, 17 November 2005.

³⁸ Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.) (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia), p.74-77. See Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, "Kezaliman Akan Terus Saya Lawan" (I Will Fight Against the Evil) in *hidayatullah.com*, Mei 2004.

allies were the actors behind the occupation of Palestine and the Israel conflict.³⁹ Moreover, MMI believe that the interference of these western countries in Iraq and Afghanistan – the imposing of democratization – originates from political and economic interests.

Another Islamic organization is the Defender Front for Islam (FPI). It was established soon after the founding of reformation regime in which Habibie was the first President. There was an assumption that the FPI was founded to protect the government from critical secular nationalist and leftist movements. The government was afraid that civilian movements that demanded and forced their agendas would endanger the state and tend to be chaotic.⁴⁰

However, as the founders declared, the FPI was established to ‘command truth and prevent sin’ (*amr ma’ruf nahy munkar*). The FPI was inaugurated in Jakarta in August 1998. The founders intended FPI to be a movement promoting the implementation of *shari’a*. However, as far as the FPI is concerned, this agenda does not mean that it wants to change *Pancasila* and democracy. For FPI, the Indonesian political system is final. They intend rather to establish *shari’a* for Indonesian Muslims, as formulated in the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*). Therefore they lobbied Islamic political parties and also demonstrated to push People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) to amend article 29 of UUD ‘45 (Indonesian constitution). Moreover, they created a committee to study the implementation of *shari’a* in certain Indonesian regions.⁴¹

FPI became infamous following its involvement in the religious conflict of 1998. A couple of weeks after this conflict, similar religious conflicts took place in the Moluccas. In fact, the FPI was characterized by actions such as the destruction of night clubs, cafes, and discotheques. This organization is classified as radical because of its violent approach to solving the problem.⁴² They eliminated evils (*kemaksiatan*) by

³⁹ See “Habib dan Ba’asyir: Haram berwala’ dengan Musuh Islam” (It is Prohibited to take the Enemies of Islam as our Leader) in *swaramuslim.net*, 16 October 2003.

⁴⁰ See Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.) (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia).

⁴¹ Fahlesa Munabari, *Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia: the Quest for the Caliphate and Sharia* (unpublished paper presented at International Workshop on Islam and Middle East: Dynamics of Social and Political Transformation, Kyoto University, August 2-3, 2008), p.6. Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, *Dialog Piagam Jakarta: Kumpulan Jawaban Al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Husein Syihab Seputar Keraguan terhadap Penegakan Syariat Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: PIS, 2000) p.30

⁴² Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, (eds.) (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia), p.22-25.

devastating places which they believed facilitated sin. Furthermore, they commanded Muslims to eliminate deviant forms of Islam, such as Ahmadiyah and Liberal Islam. According to FPI, Muslims are obliged to purify and protect Islam from deviation.

FPI's attitude poses a potential threat to democracy. Democracy requires dialogue and legal supremacy in problem solving. Democracy requires that people take action based on evidence and not on their assumptions. The authority to decide right or wrong belongs to the state (police and judicative institutions). Violence would create chaos for Indonesian law and order.⁴³

The next Islamic organization is the FKAWJ. It was established by Ja'far Umar Thalib in a *tabligh akbar* (mass religious meeting) in February 1999. The establishment of the FKAWJ was motivated primarily by the impact of the economic and political crisis in 1998.⁴⁴ The political confrontation between civil movements – represented by secular nationalist and leftist activists on the one hand, and the state, on the other hand – was interpreted by FKAWJ as a conflict between a Muslim government and secularists. FKAWJ joined other Islamic movements to defend the government from angry demonstrations.⁴⁵ The main agenda of the FKAWJ, and the other radical Islam organizations mentioned previously, is to implement *shari'a* for Indonesian Muslims.⁴⁶ The FKAWJ believed that *shari'a* should be used to solve the economic and political crisis.

The FKAWJ was also involved in religious conflict in Ambon. This organization called on Muslims to become fighters (*Mujahid*) and it created a group called *Laskar Jihad* (sacred fighters).⁴⁷ The call attracted many Muslims to join *Laskar Jihad*.⁴⁸ The presence of *Laskar Jihad* in Ambon strengthened the religious conflict between Muslims

⁴³ See Saiful Mujani, *Muslim Demokrat: Islam, Budaya Demokrasi, dan Partisipasi Politik di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* (Democrat Muslims: Islam, the Culture of Democracy, and Political Participation in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2007).

⁴⁴ Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development" in *Journal of Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East*, Vol.27, No.1, 2007, p.8

⁴⁵ Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds). (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia), p.26.

⁴⁶ See Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and Quest for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia* (New York: Ithaca, 2006). Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, (eds.) *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia* (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia), p.27.

⁴⁷ See Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*.

⁴⁸ Birgit Brauchler, "Islamic Radicalism Online: The Moluccan Mission of the Laskar Jihad in Cyberspace" in *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, Vol.15, No.3, 2004.

and Christians.⁴⁹ In fact, the conflict in Ambon was more a political and economic contestation between the local inhabitants and newcomers who transmigrated from other places. While most of the local settlements are Christians, the newcomers are Muslims. These newcomers are dominant in politics and economics which created jealousy among the local population. These jealousies and tensions spilled over into physical confrontation.⁵⁰

The final Islamic organization is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). There is no clear information about when HTI was established. According to Ismail Yusanto, the spokesperson of HTI, HTI activities have been conducted since the 1980s. They hold weekly discussions and *pengajian* (study on Islamic teachings) in campus mosques. The strict political policy of the New Order in respect of Islamic movements forced them underground, to conduct their activities in secret. HTI was able to emerge unfettered and participate in public discourse after the fall of the New Order regime.⁵¹

The HTI style of preaching Islam attracted many students and well-educated people. HTI prefer to use discussion and dialogue as tools for proselytization. They criticize western secular systems such as capitalism and democracy. According to HTI, the version of Islam implemented by the Prophet Muhammad and his contemporaries (*al-salaf al-salih*) is the best system for Indonesia. Although HTI rejects the existing system in Indonesia, they do not call Muslims to war against the government. The main idea promoted by HTI is to establish an Islamic caliphate (*Khilafah Islamiyah*).⁵² HTI intends to unify Muslim countries under one political command.

These four organizations are some of the radical Islamic movements which emerged during the transitional period. There are other, similar, organizations which are not mentioned here. FPI, HTI, MMI, and FKAWJ are the most obvious movements coloring the Indonesian political and social sphere. While these organizations differ in

⁴⁹ James J Fox, *Currents in Contemporary Islam in Indonesia* (the Paper is available at http://dspace.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/42039/1/Islam_in_Indonesia2.pdf, and was presented at Harvard Asia Vision, Cambridge), p.16.

⁵⁰ Azyumardi Azra. "An Islamic Perspective of Religious Pluralism" in *Indonesia: the Impact of Democracy on Conflict Resolution' in Religious Pluralism in Democratic Societies* (Singapore, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007), p.232-236.

⁵¹ Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, (eds) (The Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia), p.169-174.

⁵² James J Fox, *Currents in Contemporary Islam in Indonesia*, p.2.

emphasis, they share a common issue – the desire to establish *shari'a* in various spheres of Indonesian society.

Conclusion

As O'Donnell explains, the transitional period was a crucial period. Transition is a turning point that may lead to the consolidation of democracy or see a return to an authoritarian political system. People are still learning how to deal with and are adjusting to democracy. The shift in the political configuration is one of the indications that people were looking for a new equilibrium. A successful democratic transition cannot be rushed, however. The duration of the process depends on how people overcome the political and social anomalies. Extremity and radicalism, such as the radical Islamic movements examined here, are some of the anomalies which emerged during the transitional period in Indonesia.

Radical Islam organizations have a sectarian agenda. They intend to implement *shari'a* for Muslims, diminish deviant Islamic organizations, and establish an Islamic caliphate. Generally speaking, democracy provides freedom, and the state allows any ideas and organizations to become established. However, democracy will disappear if it is not supported by democratic values. The role radical Islamic movements play in strengthening sectarian and primordial ideas disturb democratization. Therefore the presence of radical Islam challenged democratic transition in Indonesia. The future of democracy in Indonesia depends on how Indonesian people overcome these radical Islamic movements.

CHAPTER III

MUHAMMADIYAH AND SALAFI MOVEMENTS

Muhammadiyah scholars represented salafi movement.¹ As salafi, Muhammadiyah scholars propagate a return to the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* as the basis of their faith, and espouse purification and reformation. However these ideas are variously interpreted by them. Pradana Boy mentions that there are two wings within Muhammadiyah – progressive scholars and fundamentalist scholars.² This chapter will examine the extent of the relationship between Muhammadiyah and the Salafi movement.

A. Salafiyya and radical Islam

Salafiyya is defined as an Islamic movement that considers the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah* as the only true source of Islamic doctrine as interpreted by the Ulama of *al-Salafu al-Salih*.³ Etymologically, it is defined as the early period in Islamic history in which the prophet and his companions lived.⁴ It does not mean that Salafism rejects all Islamic tradition outside of the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*. Salafism accepts classical and medieval Islamic tradition, but not as main sources. They are used as references and for comparison. Thus, Salafism adopts an eclectic approach which combines all Islamic jurisprudence schools. This eclectic approach is not strictly bound to specific Islamic jurisprudence such as Shafii, Maliki, Hanbali, and Hanafi. However, it selects and mixes methods and products originating from those schools of law. Generally, Salafi use Hambali as their main source of reference, especially the *Wahhabi* variant.⁵

¹ See Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia* (The Islam Syariat Movement: Reproduction of Ideological Salafiyya in Indonesia) (Jakarta: PSAP Muhammadiyah, 2007).

² See Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam: the Conservative-Progressive Debate within Muhammadiyah* (Unpublished Thesis, Canberra: Australian National University, 2007).

³ *Al-salaf al-salih* are Ulama who lived in the first and second generation after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.

⁴ Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: Harper Sanfransisco, 2007), p.75. See Madawi al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation* (New York: Cambridge University, 2007).

⁵ See Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft*. See also Madawi al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*. See also Richard Bonney, *Jihad: From Qur'an to Bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

The early history of the Salafi movement is represented by the neo-Hanbalian, Ibn Taymiyyah (14th Century). In fact, he revived Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal's method that was known as *ahlu al-hadith*. Taymiyyah propagated the purification of Islamic rituals and doctrines.⁶ Several centuries later (18th century), Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab propagated Salafiyya as well. Later, this movement became what is now called Wahhabi. For Khaled Aboul Fadl, however, Wahhabiyya and Salafiyya are different.⁷ Although both of them command a return to *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, Wahhabi is more intolerant and condones the use of violence – including the destruction of historical sites – in propagating their doctrines. Wahhabiyya followers believe that worship on religious sites is heresy. They believe that it is the biggest sin in front of God. That is why they do not tolerate local customs infiltrating Islamic belief and rituals.

According to Abou El Fadl, the most prominent salafi movement was represented by Jamaludin al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), dan Rasyid Ridha (1865-1935).⁸ They lived in 19th and early 20th century. Those scholars tended to adopt modernity when interpreting Islamic texts. Although their method is not different to that of previous salafi – they still adhere strictly to the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah* – they are more liberal than the others. In their hands, the salafi movement became adaptive and responsive to modern and contemporary ideas in relation to social, educational, and political issues. They represented the reformation of Islamic thought rather than the purification of rituals.⁹

According to Azyumardi Azra, Salafiyya can generally be divided into two categories, classic Salafiyya or peaceful Salafiyya; and neo-Salafiyya or radical Salafiyya.¹⁰ This classification is based on the complex interaction between the two and the spread of western culture and modernization. Classic Salafiyya is not intolerant of and does not reject modern thought, whereas neo-Salafiyya does. Thus, though both schools

⁶ See Richard Bonney, *Jihad: From Qur'an to Bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). See also Shireen T Hunter, *Reformist Voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009).

⁷ Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft*, p.75-79

⁸ Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft*, p.75.

⁹ See Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

¹⁰ Azyumardi Azra, (2006) *Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Dynamic in a Global Context* (Jakarta: Solistice, The Asia Foundation and ICIP), p.169.

share the same basic method, they have different characteristics. Wiktorowicz also classified Salafiyya in two categories: jihadi Salafiyya and reformist Salafiyya. According to Wiktorowicz, Jihadi salafi refers to a group of salafi who believe jihad to be an armed struggle. Furthermore, *Jihad* is seen as an individual obligation (*fardhu 'ain*) for all Muslims wherever they are in the world.¹¹ On the other hand, reformist salafi does not agree with violence. They prefer to use education and dialogue in establishing Islamic society.

However, recent developments – post Abduh and Rido – in the salafi movement have tended towards radicalism. Sayyid Qutb is assessed as the figure inspiring this tendency.¹² He represented *jihadi* salafi or radical salafi. Sayyid Qutb called for Muslims to fight against western domination and those Islamic rulers he sees as agents of western interest. Moreover, he divides Muslim lands into two types: *dar al-harb* (war lands) and *dar al-Islam* (peaceful/saved lands). These rigid ideas see people in two categories – good and bad. To some extent, the radical thought of this salafi figure originates from the social and political conditions of his time. He lived in an era of (post) colonialism and war. He was in confrontation with the government over its close relations with the western officers. Furthermore, in his opinion, the government represented western values which separated and even marginalized Islamic authority from the state. As a result, this salafi figure sought to establish an Islamic state or theocracy. This idea is classified by observers as radical. Some radical movements, especially those employing murder and terror tactics against the secular government, have been significantly influenced by Sayyid Qutb's thoughts.¹³

According to Abou El Fadl, since the 1970s salafis have become more puritan. This has been caused by wahhabis who claim that their movement is the contemporary face of salafiyya.¹⁴ In fact, for Abou El Fadl, Wahhabiyya and Salafiyya are different in character.¹⁵ Not all salafis reject modernism, there are some salafi movements that accept

¹¹ Quintan Wiktorowicz, (2005) "The Salafi Movement Violence and The Fragmentation of Community" in Mariam Cooke and Bruce B Lawrence (eds), *Muslims Network from Hajj to Hip Hop* (USA: The University of Carolina Press, 2005), p.209.

¹² See Gilles Kepel, *The Roots of Radical Islam* (London: Saqi, 2005).

¹³ See Gilles Kepel, *The Roots of Radical Islam*.

¹⁴ See Madawi al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*.

¹⁵ See Khaled Abou el-Fadl, *The Great Theft*. See also DeLong Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

and adopt modernism as part of their tradition. Muhammad Abduh is the best example in this category, whereas all Wahhabis reject modernism.¹⁶ For them, modernism hails from infidel western culture and therefore incompatible with Islamic doctrines. Wahhabi was established by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, a Muslim scholar who followed and developed Salafiyya doctrines. He did not tolerate other Islamic groups which had a different opinion to him or interpreted doctrines differently, in particular the concept of *tauhid* (theology) and rituals.¹⁷ So, in the early stages of their development, salafi and wahhabi were not identical. Later, the trends of salafi became increasingly associated with wahhabi. This trend is also supported by the fact that Saudi Arabia facilitates the propagation of Wahhabiyya in Islamic countries. Indonesia is one of the locations where Wahhabiyya is propagated intensively.

According to Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, the emergence of salafi movements in Indonesia has been dominated by wahhabi. Communication Forum of *Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* (FKAWJ) – which later created *Laskar Jihad* – Islamic Defender Front (FPI), and *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) are all representatives of radical salafi movement that are significantly influenced by Wahhabi.¹⁸ They all insist on establishing *shari'a* and an Islamic state. Moreover, they believe democracy to be unislamic, and incompatible with the faith. They believe that God is the owner of sovereignty and the implementation of *shari'a* to be a logical consequence of God's sovereignty. They are intolerant of followers of other religions, in some cases preventing Christians from conducting their rituals. More extreme, are the bomb terrors used by some radical groups to reinforce their message that the world is divided in two: an Islamic area (*dar al-Islam*) and an infidel area (*dar al-kufr* or *al-harb*); and people are divided into Muslims (friend) and *kafir* or infidel (enemy). According to their interpretation, God commands Muslims to fight against infidels.

¹⁶ See Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft*.

¹⁷ See DeLong Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*. See also Richard Bonney, *Jihad*. Also Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

¹⁸ Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, *Gerakan Dakwah Salafi Pasca Laskar Jihad*. The paper is available at www.ern.pendis.depag.go.id/DokPdf/ern-iv-02 (2009), p.7.

Muhammadiyah is classified as reformist salafi.¹⁹ Muhammadiyah has been inspired by the views of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida.²⁰ Muhammadiyah's leaders such as Ahmad Dahlan, Haji Abdul Malik Amrullah (Haji Rosul), and Hamka have been significantly influenced by their thought. Dahlan and Haji Rosul learned about the movement when they studied in Mecca and from magazines (*Urwatul Wuthqa and al-Manar*) maintained by Abduh and Rida, which once again links Muhammadiyah to the salafi movement propagated by Abduh and Rida.²¹ As stated previously, however, later developments within Muhammadiyah tended towards wahhabiyya, influenced by wahhabi movements supported by Saudi Arabia.²²

B. Muhammadiyah and progressive scholars

In general, the Muhammadiyah movement can be considered modern. Many modern institutions such as hospital, schools, universities, and banks have been developed and maintained by Muhammadiyah.²³ Unfortunately, as explained by Azyumardi Azra, Muhammadiyah is modern in terms of organization, but not in thought. Azra goes on to say that while the routine activities of Muhammadiyah include maintaining educational, social, and other modern institutions, the organization is less responsive to contemporary issues relating to modern social and political problems. Muhammadiyah is more concerned with issues of ritual.²⁴ This is illustrated by the fatwas issued by the Majelis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah either via the executive board or at the level of local institutions. Most of the fatwas are related to *bid'ah* (heresy).

¹⁹ See Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (The Islam Syariat Movement).

²⁰ See Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: the Political Behaviour of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989).

²¹ See Hafiz Zakaria, "Islamic Reform in Malaya: The Contribution of Shaikh Tahir Jalaludin" in *Journal Intellectual Discourse-IIUM* (International Islamic University of Malaysia), Vol.13, No.1, 2005. See also Alfian, *Muhammadiyah*

²² See Ahmad Najib Burhani, *The Muhammadiyah's Attitude to Javanese Culture in 1912-1930: Appreciation and Tension* (unpublished thesis in the University of Leiden, 2004).

²³ See Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900 -1942* (Jakarta: LPeEs, 1980), p.316-345.

²⁴ See Azyumardi Azra, *Konteks Berteologi di Indonesia: Pengalaman Islam* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999)

This trend is the result of an increased emphasis on purification. In fact, Muhammadiyah has two main tenets – purification and dynamization or reformation.²⁵ In the Ahmad Dahlan era, Muhammadiyah was more responsive to social problems such as education and the economy.²⁶ This reflects that in the early stages of the movement, Muhammadiyah focused on reformation. In more recent times, that focus has shifted to purification issues. This shift cannot be separated from Islamic transnational movements such as wahhabi that have penetrated Indonesia. The wahhabi movement attracted Muhammadiyah activists. Principally, wahhabi has similar concerns to other salafi movements. They call on Muslims to return to the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah* (Prophet Tradition). Furthermore, Wahhabi are not tolerant of diversity.²⁷ As a result, today Muhammadiyah is more known as a puritan movement that wants to rid what they imagine as pure Islam of local customs.

In general, Muhammadiyah has supported the modern nation state and has had no interest in establishing an Islamic state.²⁸ As a modernist movement, since the outset, Muhammadiyah has eagerly provided education for Muslims. Muhammadiyah sees the cultural movement as a basic requirement for modern Indonesia. The nature of Muhammadiyah is also shown by its vision and mission as set out in the organization's constitution. At the 33rd Muhammadiyah Muktamar²⁹ in 1956, three leaders of Muhammadiyah, namely K.H. Fakhri Usman, Prof. K.H.M Faried Ma'ruf, and Dr. Hamka presented the concept of *Masyarakat Islam yang sebenar-benarnya* (the truly Muslim society).³⁰ This concept was accepted as Muhammadiyah's vision. According to Haedar Nashir, this concept emphasized social education rather than political orientation.³¹ It was clear there was no intention to establish an Islamic state. Muhammadiyah leaders believe that education is a basic necessity for improving Indonesian dignity.

²⁵ Syamsul Anwar, "Fatwa, Purification and Dynamization: a Study of Tarjih in Muhammadiyah" in *Journal of Islamic Law and Society*, Vol.12, afl.1, 2005.

²⁶ See Alfian, *Muhammadiyah*. See also Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900 - 1942*.

²⁷ See Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft*. See also DeLong Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*.

²⁸ Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (The Islam Syariat Movement).

²⁹ Muktamar is Muhammadiyah national meeting attended by all boards of Muhammadiyah conducted once in five years to decide vision and mission of Muhammadiyah, and its chair persons.

³⁰ Haedar Nashir, *Ideologi Gerakan Muhammadiyah* (the Ideology of Muhammadiyah Movement) (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2001), p.62.

³¹ See Haedar Nashir, *Ideologi Gerakan Muhammadiyah* (the Ideology of Muhammadiyah Movement).

Furthermore, there is an obvious commitment by Muhammadiyah to support secular political government, as shown by a formal statement from its leaders. Syafii Maarif, the chairperson in 1999-2005, stated in a Muhammadiyah Mukhtamar that democracy is the best political system for establishing human rights and Islamic society.³² This commitment has been proved since the early days of Indonesian independence. Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, the Muhammadiyah representative on the Committee of Indonesian Independence preparation (BPUPKI and PPKI) agreed that the sentence mentioning the implementation of *shari'a* for Indonesian Muslims should be eliminated from *Pancasila* and UUD'45 (national ideology and constitution). Actually, the decision to eliminate the sentences came from nationalists represented by Muhammad Hatta and Sukarno. They argued that if the national constitution makes mention of certain religions and guarantees the implementation of state *shari'a*, other religious followers (non-Muslims) would feel disappointed. Hatta made known that some religious leaders had demanded that the sentences be removed.³³ This decision was difficult, since most Indonesian Muslim leaders wanted the state to implement *shari'a* for Muslims. Hadikusumo and others on the committees discussed the relationship between the state and religion. He realized that Indonesia is a plural country, and that it would be wise to make Indonesia a home for all people. He convinced Indonesian Muslim leaders that the constitution, which separated state and religion, is compatible with Islam.³⁴ In addition, Muhammadiyah developed modern educational institutions attempting to support this policy of modernization developed by the Old Order and New Order government.

This fact is cultural capital for Muhammadiyah scholars. Although aspects of the Muhammadiyah tend to be puritan, in general the organization is still committed to modern values. At the end of 1990s, Muhammadiyah showed a progressive rather than puritan face. Social and political conditions also triggered this progressive wing to be involved in guiding the transitional period.³⁵

³² Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Independensi Muhammadiyah di tengah Pergumulan Pemikiran Islam dan Politik* (the Independency of Muhammadiyah within Islamic Thought and Political Struggle) (Jakarta: Cidesindo, 2000), p.106.

³³ See Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan* (Islam and the Problem of the States) (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985).

³⁴ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan* (Islam and the Problem of the States), p.109.

³⁵ See Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam*.

Generally speaking, the method of interpretation used by Muhammadiyah is one of its advantages. As Majelis Tarjih describes, Muhammadiyah has implemented *istislah* since its establishment. K.H. Ahmad Dahlan performed *istislah* relating to modern educational and social institutions.

B.1. The Istislah method in Muhammadiyah

According to Nadirsyah Hosen, *istislah* is the basis of *maqāsid al-sharī'ah*,³⁶ and the use of *istislah* means that Muhammadiyah accepts *maqāsid al-sharī'ah*. *Istislah* is one of three methods used by Muhammadiyah in performing *ijtihad*. The first is *ijtihad bayani*, the second is *ijtihad qiyasi*, and the last is *ijtihad istislahi*.³⁷ The *bayani* method is based on text. Reason is used only to give further and detailed explanation. The *qiyasi* uses analogical reasoning. It still makes reference to the text by finding 'illah (reason or cause) between new problems that are not yet explained and the issue that is mentioned in the *Qur'an*.

Istislah is used when the problem issued has not yet been explained by the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*. That is why the use of reason dominates rather than other methods. In relation to this, Muhammadiyah believes that Muslims are allowed to practice *ijtihad*.³⁸ This position is quite different from other salafi movements, which mostly use the ulama of *al-salafu al-salih*'s interpretation.

Istislah implemented by Muhammadiyah in issuing fatwa shows that *ijtihad* is urgent. Furthermore Muhammadiyah stated that *taklid* is forbidden.³⁹ *Taklid* is defined by Muhammadiyah as following one of the schools of law (*madhhab*) without critical understanding. *Taklid* is seen as an obstacle to Muslims finding new meanings and understanding about a text, whereas *ijtihad* is believed to be the gate to exploring the contextual and contemporary understanding of the text. From the early period of its emergence, Muhammadiyah placed *ijtihad* as the most important factor that should be

³⁶ Nadirsyah Hosen, "Revelation in a Modern Nation State: Muhammadiyah and Islamic Legal Reasoning in Indonesia" in *Australian Journal of Asian Law*, Vol.4, No.3, 2002, p.237.

³⁷ Fathurrahman Djamil. "The Muhammadiyah and the Theory of Maqāsid al-Sharī'ah" in *Studia Islamika* 2(1), 1995, p.61.

³⁸ Fathurrahman Djamil, *Metode Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah* (the Method of Majelis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah) (Jakarta: Logos Publishing House, 1995), p.158-159

³⁹ Nadirsyah Hosen, "Revelation in a Modern Nation State: Muhammadiyah and Islamic Legal Reasoning in Indonesia" in *Australian Journal of Asian Law*, Vol.4, No.3, 2002, p.236.

developed by Muslims.⁴⁰ As a result, Muhammadiyah established many modern educational, economic, and social institutions that adopted a contemporary interpretation of the *Qur'an*. The use of *istislah* needs other tools such as sociology, biology, economic science, and medical science. To facilitate *ijtihad istislahi*, Muhammadiyah invited scholars who are expert in each field as a way of enriching the process of formulating contextual Islamic jurisprudence.⁴¹

According to Nadirsyah Hosen, although Muhammadiyah is described as anti-*madhhab*, which means that Muhammadiyah refuses to accept or follow strictly any school of Islamic law, the organization will accept the opinions of various schools as long as they are in line with the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*.⁴² Moreover, Muhammadiyah has not produced a formal and strict method for issuing a fatwa.⁴³ However, this does not mean that its fatwas are not based on certain methods or Islamic legal theories.⁴⁴ According to Muhammadiyah, the role of reason (*'aql*) is significant in dealing with contemporary *fiqh* problems, as long as they are related to social contemporary matters. However this does not mean that Muhammadiyah condones the use of reason freely.⁴⁵ *Istislah* is considered to be the basis for legal decision.⁴⁶

As explained above, Muhammadiyah often performed *ijtihad* based on the method of *istislah*. Referring to the paper presented by The Central Board of Muhammadiyah Majelis Tarjih entitled *The Brief Ijtihad Methods that have been used by Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah* in The Guidelines of the Majelis Tarjih Conference, Muhammadiyah believes that public interest (*masalah al-'āmmah*) should be taken into account in worldly matters (*al-'umūr ad-dunyāwiyah*). Accordingly, the role of reason in dealing with *mu'amalah* problems is significant.⁴⁷ According to Djamil:

⁴⁰ Fathurrahman Djamil, *Metode Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah* (the Method of Majelis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah), p.159.

⁴¹ Syamsul Anwar, "Fatwa, Purification and Dynamization".

⁴² Nadirsyah Hosen, "Revelation in a Modern Nation State", p.237.

⁴³ Fathurrahman Djamil, *Manhaj Istimbat Hukum dalam Muhammadiyah* (the Method of Producing Islamic Law in Muhammadiyah), paper presented at Raker Majelis Tarjih PWM DKI Jakarta, 30 November 1997.

⁴⁴ Nadirsyah Hosen, "Revelation in a Modern Nation State, p.237.

⁴⁵ See Fathurrahman Djamil. "The Muhammadiyah and the Theory of Maqāsid al-Sharī'ah".

⁴⁶ Ahmad Azhar Basyir, *Refleksi atas Persoalan Keislaman* (A Reflection on Islamic Issues) (Bandung: Mizan, 1994).

⁴⁷ The Central Board of Muhammadiyah Majelis Tarjih, "Brief Ijtihad Methods that Have Been Used by Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah" in *The Guidelines of the Majelis Tarjih Conference* (1989), p.21.

Imam Malik himself, who was regarded as the founding father of this method, required three conditions. Firstly, the *maslahah* should be reasonable (*ma'qūl*) and suitable (*munāsib*) to the case that is to be decided. Secondly, the aim of *maslahah* is to preserve the necessity (*darūrī*) and to prevent or eradicate hardship (*raf'u al-haraj*) by avoiding injury (*madarraḥ*). Thirdly, it should not contradict the objectives of the sharia (*maqāsid al-sharī'ah*). The Muhammadiyah has tried to apply the method of *istislah* to several contemporary questions, such as in vitro fertilization and organ transplants. In the case of the former, the Muhammadiyah decided that, as long as the semen is from the husband himself, in vitro fertilization is permissible in Islam.⁴⁸

Furthermore Djamil says that the reason behind Muhammadiyah's view is that the *Qur'an* and the *Hadits* do not provide an explicit explanation for cases such as this. Therefore, based on the principle of *maslahah*, it is permissible. In this case, Muhammadiyah considers *maslahah* to be necessary (*al-maslahah al-darūriyyah*) to preserve the offspring (*hifdh al-nasl*).⁴⁹

The implementing of the *istislah* method is not common amongst Islamic organizations, particularly in the context of Indonesian Islam. It tends to be used only by Muhammadiyah and not by other Salafi movements. Nahdatul Ulama (NU) also did not perform *istislah*, at least in the beginning of its development. To see how far *istislah* is used in Indonesian Islam I will refer to M.B. Hooker. In his book entitled *Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatāwā* (2003), Hooker states that there are differences between Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama in the way they respond to several problems related to (a) modern transactions such as sale, sale with promise to repurchase, security, renting, hiring, pawning goods, mail order purchases, buying blind, and coins and money in the form of notes and cheques; (b) banks and interest-based banking; and (c) insurance.⁵⁰ According to Hooker, Muhammadiyah's fatwas are based on a consideration of the social benefits (*maslahah al-'ammah*), whereas those issued by NU are based purely on *fiqih* text.⁵¹ The description he provides about the fatwas from these two organizations demonstrates two very different products, but products which have significantly influenced the development of Indonesia. To some extent,

⁴⁸ Fathurrahman Djamil. "The Muhammadiyah and the Theory of Maqāsid al-Sharī'ah", p.64. See Mukhtar Tarjih's decision, *In Vitro Fertilization, in Bayi Tabung dan Pencangkokan dalam Sorotan Hukum Islam* (Yogyakarta: Persatuan, 1980), p.85.

⁴⁹ Fathurrahman Djamil, "The Muhammadiyah and the Theory of Maqāsid al-Sharī'ah", p.65.

⁵⁰ M.B. Hooker, *Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), p.197-200.

⁵¹ M.B. Hooker, *Indonesian Islam*, p.200-211.

Muhammadiyah has been more supportive than NU of government policies related to the modernization of Indonesia, especially during the early days of its development (1912) until the 1980s. As mentioned by Hooker, this is the main factor behind the difference in the methods used by both organizations.⁵² Generally speaking, *fiqh* texts were constructed and produced within certain contexts. Therefore, those who are using *fiqh* in responding to contemporary social-economical problems do not intend to automatically avoid the context. They can learn the context from each classical and medieval *fiqh* text. This kind of method enriches and enlarges the perspective and insight. In this way, Hooker shows that the notion that *fiqh* is the determining factor in NU becoming more conservative is inadequate. The method can make a fatwa become either conservative or progressive. It depends on how the *fiqh* texts are used. This can be seen in recent developments of the NU. They reinterpreted and developed classical and medieval *fiqh* in order that they become compatible with modernity. This was particularly the case under Abdurrahman Wahid's leadership. He promoted this new method of interpreting *fiqh*, based on public interest (*maslahah al-'āmmah*).

The implementation of *istislah* indicates the dynamic spirit of Muhammadiyah. Although there are times when *istislah* leads to conservative outcomes, such as Djamil's remarks concerning interreligious marriage,⁵³ it is the proper method to contextualize the meaning and message of Islamic doctrines within contemporary society.

B.2. The rise of progressive scholars and hermeneutics

As explained above, recent developments in Muhammadiyah show that the organization tends to be puritan, particularly following the penetration of wahhabi in Indonesia. Many Muhammadiyah activists were interested in adopting Wahhabiyya. Muhammadiyah became more concerned with issues of ritual such as *bid'ah* (heresy). However, the dynamic or progressive movement in Muhammadiyah has not totally disappeared. Beside the increase in puritan character, there have also been some progressive movements made by Muhammadiyah. Many fatwas related to contemporary social problems were issued by the Majelis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah from the 1960 to the 1980s, especially related to

⁵² M.B. Hooker, *Indonesian Islam*, p.197-211.

⁵³ Fathurrahman Djamil. "The Muhammadiyah and the Theory of Maqāsid al-Sharī'ah", p.65-67.

economic and other public life issues.⁵⁴ This indicates that to a certain extent Muhammadiyah remains true to the modernist reformist version of salafiyya.

In general, since the end of 1990s, Muhammadiyah has shown a more progressive nature than previously. The emergence and involvement of progressive scholars such as Amin Abdullah, Amien Rais, Munir Mul Khan, Syafii Maarif, and Moeslim Abdurrahman on the board of the organization has colored the character of Muhammadiyah. They have a tendency to respond contemporary social problems rather than ritual issues.⁵⁵ It means that they have returned the Muhammadiyah movement to the early spirit of Muhammadiyah as developed by KH Ahmad Dahlan.

In 2000, the Majelis Tarjih released an exegesis concerning relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims.⁵⁶ In fact, the book does not contain any fatwas. It is a product of *Wacana Tarjih*, so that it does not bind the organization and its members. However, it has colored the nature and affected the religious mind set of Muhammadiyah. Moreover, the Majelis Tarjih had issued a fatwa that reconstructed or produced new meanings of rituals implemented in social life. The fatwa of *hewan kurban* (slaughtered animal for 'Id al-Adha ceremony) issued in 2005 is an example of this.⁵⁷

Progressive Muhammadiyah scholars developed and combined the *istislah* method with hermeneutics. To some extent, *istislah* is similar to hermeneutics in that they both tend to interpret and produce contextual meanings of a text. The combination of *istislah* and hermeneutics enables these progressive scholars to reconstruct responsive interpretations concerning Islam and social problems. This combining of *istislah* and hermeneutics was a characteristic of Amin Abdullah's leadership of the Center Board of Majelis Tarjih.⁵⁸ However, he was not the only member of the Majelis Tarjih to adopt this view, Muhammadiyah scholars such as Munir Mul Khan and Syamsul Anwar shared his approach. In addition, other progressive Muhammadiyah scholars, including Syafii Maarif, Moeslim Abdurrahman, Amien Rais and Hamim Ilyas also employ hermeneutic

⁵⁴ M.B. Hooker, *Indonesian Islam*, p.197-211.

⁵⁵ Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam*, p.100-111.

⁵⁶ Syamsul Anwar, "Fatwa, Purification and Dynamization, p.38-39.

⁵⁷ See M Hilaly Basya, *Muhammadiyah's Fatwa about Hewan Kurban in 2005: A Study on Muhammadiyah's Method in Producing Fatwa* (unpublished paper, Leiden, 2009).

⁵⁸ See Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam*.

methods in interpreting Islamic doctrines, although they do not mention their tool explicitly. They are often called the liberal or progressive wing of Muhammadiyah.⁵⁹

Hermeneutics is a new discourse in Indonesian Islam. It was introduced by progressive scholars such as Fazlurrahman, Mohammed Arkoun, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, and Mohammad Abid al-Jabiri. Since the middle of the 1990s there have been many books published discussing hermeneutics indicating that the debate is not restricted to Muhammadiyah scholars. Hermeneutics has also been adopted by others such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Hermeneutics is a philosophical method that is used to interpret and understand a text.⁶⁰ A text is produced at a certain time and in a certain context and the author adds his own meaning in the writing of the text. Hermeneutics seeks to mediate the gap between the reader and the context in which the text was written.⁶¹ In addition, it is necessary to take into account the social, political, and cultural situation when the author wrote the text. This helps the reader to understand the meaning of the text better. Hermeneutics is often used to examine the contextual meaning of sacred texts such as the Bible and the *Qur'an*.

Yet the use of hermeneutics is controversial, especially in the Islamic world because it tends to deconstruct the textual meaning of text,⁶² a consequence of interpreting the text contextually. This method of interpretation tries to return the text to the time it was written, in order to find its original meaning. Subsequently, it is then considered in the context of recent times, in order to uncover its contemporary meaning. Moreover, hermeneutics needs modern science such as sociology, anthropology, and historical science. To understand the contemporary context of a text, the social, cultural and political situation is important in the hermeneutic approach. This aids the interpreter in producing a new meaning for the text. It is possible that interpretations produced from this method omit the textual meaning; however that does not mean that the method leads the interpreter to neglect and eliminate the text *per se*.

⁵⁹ Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam*, p.2

⁶⁰ Komarudin Hidayat, "Arkoun dan Tradisi Hermeneutika" (Arkoun and Hermeneutics Tradition) in Johan Hendrik Meuleman, *Tradisi, Kemoderenan, dan Metamodernisme* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1996), p.24

⁶¹ See Komarudin Hidayat, "Arkoun dan Tradisi Hermeneutika" (Arkoun and Hermeneutics Tradition).

⁶² See Adian Husaini dan Nuim Hidayat *Islam Liberal: Sejarah, Konsepsi, Penyimpangan dan Jawabannya* (Liberal Islam: History, Conception, Deviation, and the Answers) (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002).

From a hermeneutical perspective, a text is seen as a product of culture.⁶³ The *Qur'an*, which is the revelation of God documented in text, was produced by causes and events, which in *'ulūm al-Qur'an* is called *asbāb an-nuzul*. Relating to that thesis, Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na'im distinguishes between verses revealed in Mecca and those revealed in Madina.⁶⁴ According to an-Na'im, the verses in Mecca consist of ideas of universal humanity that are not limited by religious identity, whereas Madina's verses explain law and Islamic jurisprudence. The different nature of both periods is a result of the different social and political contexts. In the hermeneutical approach, religious texts are not revealed in an empty space.⁶⁵ They are produced in an environment where social problems occur, so the texts are constructed culturally and historically. If an interpreter neglects the social-cultural context of the text, they become alienated from its message. Therefore, the meaning of the texts is not universal and permanent – it is dynamic. For example, in the case of verses explaining inheritance, the text represents the interaction between text and reality. Before Islam, Arabic society had a tradition of inter-tribal marriage to establish connections and relationships among different tribes. Unfortunately, this often resulted in conflict and war. When wives received their inheritance from their parents, it would belong to their husband – the property would accumulate within the husbands' tribe, stimulating jealousy and conflict. Arabic society eliminated the right of inheritance for women, however, when Islam emerged, Islam considered this social context and the rights of women and subsequently decided to give women (daughters) inheritance rights, while maintaining a half share for men (sons).⁶⁶ This is an important example of the kind of perspective offered by hermeneutics.

Farid Essack defines hermeneutics as a science that seeks to describe how a word, text, or event that occurred in the past can be understood and meaningfully exist in the present. Furthermore, Essack says that hermeneutics wants to mediate the gap between

⁶³ Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, *Mafhūm al-Nas: Dirāsah fī 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*, (Cairo: al-Hay'at al-Misriyyah al-'Ammat al-Kitab, 1993), 1st edition, p.11-12.

⁶⁴ Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na'im, *Dekonstruksi Syari'ah: Wacana Kebebasan Sipil, HAM, dan Hubungan Internasional dalam Islam* (translated) Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001.

⁶⁵ See M Hilaly Basya, "The Koran was not Revealed in an Empty Space" in www.islamlib.com, 2004.

⁶⁶ Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, *Post Tradisionalisme Islam* (translated) Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001, p.126.

the past and the present.⁶⁷ In hermeneutics, there is a close relationship between the revelation process, language, content, and community that consume texts.⁶⁸ Texts were produced in crucial struggles with specific communities' problems. The texts are not universal. They represent certain cultures as seen in Qur'anic texts that are predominantly influenced by Arabic culture. In addition, Moeslim Abdurrahman says that in order to produce a new and relevant meaning of Qur'anic texts, it is important to know and understand the current social context. Moeslim asserts that by understanding the recent social before reading the texts, the interpreter will be led towards a responsive meaning.⁶⁹

Hermeneutics is one of the reasons why the rise of progressive Muhammadiyah scholars has attracted controversy, particularly from the conservative wing of Muhammadiyah.

Conclusion

Wicktorowicz and Azyumardi Azra mention two types of salafi, namely reformist and radical. These two variants are also described by Khaled Abou El Fadl. However, recent developments within salafi point to a more radical-islamist character.

In general, Muhammadiyah can be considered to be part of the salafi movement. The basic ideas of Salafiyya – a return to the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah* and pure Islam – are propagated by Muhammadiyah as well. However, Muhammadiyah differs from other salafi movements by adopting the *istislah* method. This method enables Muhammadiyah to be more progressive. The emergence of progressive Muhammadiyah scholars at the end of the 1990s was a direct result of this factor. However, not all Muhammadiyah figures are progressive.

⁶⁷ Farid Essack, *Qur'an, Liberation, and Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity Against Oppression* (Oxford: One World, 2002), 3rd edition, p.51.

⁶⁸ Moeslim Abdurrahman, *Islam sebagai Kritik Sosial* (Islam as Social Critique) (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2003), p.192.

⁶⁹ Moeslim Abdurrahman, *Islam sebagai Kritik Sosial* (Islam as Social Critique), p.193.

CHAPTER IV

THE POSITION OF MUHAMMADIYAH SCHOLARS REGARDING THE FORMALIZATION OF SHARI'A, SALAFIYYA, AND DEMOCRACY

The emergence of radical Islam movements in the democratic transition caught the attention of Muhammadiyah scholars. These scholars are concerned with the future of democracy in Indonesia. The basic nature of Muhammadiyah is one of the factors influencing their commitment to guide Indonesian to be democratic. Although the organization is associated with puritan ideas due to its propagation of what it believes to be pure Islam, Muhammadiyah has strengthened its dedication to a plural nation.¹

This chapter will examine the position of Muhammadiyah scholars relating to radical Islamic ideas; the way in which Muhammadiyah scholars criticize and reduce radical Islam movements in Indonesia; and also the factors influencing their ability to transform Salafiyya doctrines so that they are compatible with democracy.

A. Position of Muhammadiyah scholars on amending the constitution

Amendment of the Indonesian constitution (UUD 1945) was a crucial step in the early period of the democratic transition. The demand to change article (*pasal*) 29 resulted in heated debate among Muslim groups. Radical Islamic groups demanded Islamist political parties such as the United Development Party (PPP), the Justice Party (PK), and the Star Crescent Party (PBB) in the People Representative Assembly (MPR) called for the constitution to contain 'the seven words' (the obligation to carry out *shari'a* for adherents of Islam).²

In 2000 the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), the Solidarity Committee for Muslim World (KISDI), the United Action of Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI), and Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI) mobilized approximately five thousand people to pressure the

¹ Haedar Nashir, *Ideologi Gerakan Muhammadiyah* (The Ideology of Muhammadiyah Movement) (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2001), p.117.

² These seven words derived from the Jakarta Charter that was formulated by PPKI before Indonesian independence. Based on social and political considerations the charter was changed by the founding fathers of the 1945 constitution (UUD'45). Plurality and proper relations between the state and religions resulted in it being replaced. This change caused controversy and polemical debate between nationalists and Islamists, particularly during the Old Order regime (1945-1966).

MPR. They called on the MPR to amend article 29 of UUD 1945. Warhito Adnan, a leader of the FPI, said that the Jakarta Charter is a political right of Indonesian Muslims. Moreover, he stated that non-Muslims should not be worried, because it does not prevent non-Muslims from going about their religious worship. In his view, if *shari'a* is implemented, non-Muslims are still free to pray according to their own religions.³

These organizations believed that implementing state *shari'a* was the best solution to solving the social, economic, and political crisis. Furthermore, they accused Muslim scholars who rejected amendment of article 29, such as Syafii Maarif, Hasyim Muzadi, and Nurcholish Madjid, of betraying the Muslim struggle.

Syafii Maarif, the chairman of Muhammadiyah in that period, stated publicly that mentioning a particular religion in UUD 1945 would create disintegration. Article 29 should be seen as the final decision regarding the relations between the state and religions. Moreover, by not including 'the seven words' (obligation to carry out *shari'a* for adherents of Islam) in UUD 1945, Muslims remain unconstrained in practicing their religious doctrines. In addition, Maarif stated that attempts to force Muslims to undertake their religious teachings would fail. It would be better for Muslims to implement Islamic doctrines voluntarily.⁴

Maarif, together with Hasyim Muzadi and Nurcholish Madjid, rejected the idea of including the Jakarta Charter, and in particular 'the seven words', in UUD 1945.⁵ Maarif's position concerning the amendment of article 29 was responded to variously by Muhammadiyah activists. Some were disappointed because, according to them, it is not proper for a Muslim leader to reject *shari'a*. However, ultimately, Maarif's opinion was adopted as Muhammadiyah's position, as indicated in letter No.10/EDR/1.0/1/2002 which was released as a statement on the issue of the amendment.

Amien Rais', the chairman of the MPR and former chairman of Muhammadiyah, shared similar views to Maarif. According to Arskal Salim, *Reformasi* Fraction which represented the National Duty Party (PAN), offered to amend article 29. The redaction

³ See "Ormas Islam Demo MPR" (Islamic Organizations Initiated Public Demonstration to MPR) in *Tempo newspaper*, 15/08/2000.

⁴ See "NU dan Muhammadiyah Tegaskan Kembali Tidak Amandemen Pasal 29" (NU and Muhammadiyah restate will not amend the article 29) in *Tempo newspaper*, 7 August 2002, www.tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2002/08/07

⁵ See "NU dan Muhammadiyah Tegaskan Kembali Tidak Amandemen Pasal 29" (NU and Muhammadiyah restate will not amend the article 29).

was to be that ‘every believer is obliged to carry out their respective religious teachings’.⁶ Salim saw *Reformasi* Fraction as having similar aims to those Islamist political parties attempting to include the Jakarta Charter in the constitution. Salim also said that on the one hand PAN wanted to accommodate their constituents, most of whom were members of Muhammadiyah, while on the other hand, PAN believes that religion should not be regulated by the state. As a result, PAN offered an alternative solution which was to include ‘the seven words’ and leave the original text of article 29 UUD 1945 untouched.⁷

According to Saiful Mujani, PAN’s position regarding amendment of UUD 1945 is a progressive one, since PAN rejected the inclusion of the ‘the seven words’. Mujani believes that PAN is predominantly supported by Muhammadiyah. This shows a significant change in Muhammadiyah’s political position.⁸ Haedar Nashir shares this view. He believes PAN’s position was a clear rejection of the proposal to include the Jakarta Charter in the article 29 of UUD 1945.⁹

As chairman of PAN at that time Amien Rais played a significant role in stemming the demands of radical Islamic groups attempting to amend article 29 of UUD 1945. Furthermore, Rais argued that MPR’s intention not to amend article 29 was based on requests by Muhammadiyah, NU, and other leaders from various religions in Indonesia that insisted on keeping article 29 unchanged.¹⁰

B. Response to Perda Shari’a

For some of Muhammadiyah scholars such as Syafii Maarif, Haedar Nashir, and Moeslim Abdurrahman, Islamic law (*Perda Shari’a*)¹¹ as practiced in the province of Aceh and some other districts in Indonesia is disappointing. They have criticized the implementation of *Perda Shari’a* for not being compatible with democracy and

⁶ Arskal Salim, *Challenging the Secular State: Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia* (University of Hawai Press, 2008), p.99

⁷ Arskal Salim, *Challenging the Secular State*.

⁸ Saiful Mujani, “Politik Tujuh Kata” (Politics of the Seven Words) in *Tempo* newspaper 31 July 2002.

⁹ See Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia* (The Islam Syariat Movement: Reproduction of Ideological Salafiyah in Indonesia) (Jakarta: PSAP Muhammadiyah, 2007).

¹⁰ “Pasal 29 UUD 1945 Tidak akan Diubah” (the Article 29 of UUD 1945 will not be changed) in www.gatra.com/2002-02-29/artikel.php

¹¹ Perda (Peraturan Daerah) Sharia is District Government Regulations related to Islamic law and religious behavior for Muslim communities.

Pancasila. Syafii Maarif asserted that the *Perda* tend to weaken the foundation of national integrity. Furthermore, he stated that all of the contents of the *Perda* can be established on behalf *Pancasila*.¹² What Maarif means is that it is better to fight for the values of *shari'a* than *shari'a* (Islamic law) itself. His statement is based on the perception of the proponents of *Perda Shari'a* that *shari'a* is believed to be *fiqh* (Islamic law) produced by classic and medieval Ulama. Maarif said that this sort of *shari'a* produced at specific times and places in the past is not compatible with contemporary social and political conditions.¹³

Maarif is a well-known opponent of *Perda Shari'a*. He has often pronounced that the lifespan of *Perda Shari'a* in Indonesia will be short, since it is an external part of Islamic teachings. Moreover, he has asked the government to review *Perda Shari'a* as something which potentially disturbs the harmony of plural society. As far as Maarif is concerned, certain points of *Perda Shari'a* have become troublesome to national integrity. He argues that many non-Muslims feel that *Perda Shari'a* is making Indonesia sectarian.¹⁴

In addition, Maarif stated that MMI, HTI, and FPI – all proponents of *Perda Shari'a* – are organizations intending to establish an Islamic state.¹⁵ Together with Abdurahman Wahid, a former President and chairman of PBNU, Maarif published a book entitled *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnational di Indonesia* (the Illusion of Islamic State: the Expansion of Transnational Islamic Movement in Indonesia). This book criticizes those Islamic organizations attempting to establish an Islamic state and eliminate plurality.¹⁶ In Maarif's view, statements from these organizations mention that Muslims and non-Muslims rejecting *Perda Shari'a* could be categorized as *kafir* or, *zhalim*, and *fasik* will disturb pluralism. Maarif believes such

¹² See Syafii Maarif, "Demi Keutuhan Bangsa" (for the Integration of Nation) in *Republika* newspaper, 11 July 2006.

¹³ See Syafii Maarif, "Demi Keutuhan Bangsa" (for the Integration of Nation).

¹⁴ See Syafii Maarif, "Demi Keutuhan Bangsa" (for the Integration of Nation).

¹⁵ See "Kalau Beragama Secara Hitam Putih, Mungkin Lebih Baik Menjadi Ateis" (Better to be an Atheist than to be Radical-Puritan) in *voa-islam.com/news/features/2009/10/22/1479*

¹⁶ See Abdurahman Wahid (ed.) *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia* (the Illusion of Islamic State: the Expansion of Transnational Islamic Movement in Indonesia) (Jakarta: the Wahid Institute, 2009).

claims illustrate a rigid style of religiosity. He asserts that they simply divide people into 'white' and 'black'.¹⁷ In Maarif's view, this threatens the future of democracy.¹⁸

Haedar Nashir has also criticized those organizations promoting *shari'a* to be *Perda*. Nashir uses the term *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (*Shari'a* Islam Movement) to describe these organizations.¹⁹ According to Nashir, this *Islam Syariat* tends to be intolerant of others. They interpret Islamic teachings literally and rigidly. Hence they often clash with Muslims who have progressive interpretations of Islamic doctrines, particularly regarding Islamic law.²⁰ In Nashir's view, when *shari'a* is formalized as *Perda*, it reduces the substance of Islam.²¹

Furthermore, Nashir asserted that *Abangan* – the majority of Indonesian Muslims – are more comfortable with secular law and that the implementation of *Perda Shari'a* simply forces them to be Islamic or religious.²² In addition, he said that Islamic teachings do not intend to force people. The Prophet Muhammad performed Islam as *rahmatan lil alamin*.²³ Nashir has serious concern about these *Islam Syariat* movements as revealed in his doctoral research on this issue. His research recommends that Muhammadiyah and NU revitalize their strategy in order to counter these radical Islam movements.

With regards to *Perda Shari'a*, Din Syamsuddin stated that *Shari'a* is not equal to Islamic law. *Shari'a* is defined as the whole and principle aspects of Islamic teachings. Furthermore, Syamsuddin said that *Shari'a* emphasizes *akhlak* (behaviour). In general he does not agree with *Perda* regulating and controlling Muslims. Syamsuddin argues that *Perda* has reduced Islamic teachings and it is better to emphasize and promote Islamic values.²⁴

¹⁷ See "Kalau Beragama Secara Hitam Putih, Mungkin Lebih Baik Menjadi Ateis" (Better to be an Atheist than to be Radical-Puritan).

¹⁸ See "Kalau Beragama Secara Hitam Putih, Mungkin Lebih Baik Menjadi Ateis" (Better to be an Atheist than to be Radical-Puritan).

¹⁹ Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (The Islam Syariat Movement), p. 426.

²⁰ Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (The Islam Syariat Movement), p.426-429

²¹ See Haedar Nashir (interview), "Gerakan Formalisasi Syariat tak ada Matinya" (the Formalization of Shari'a Movements never die) in islamlib.com/id/page/.php?page=article&id=1281

²² See Haedar Nashir (interview), "Gerakan Formalisasi Syariat tak ada Matinya".

²³ See Haedar Nashir (interview), "Gerakan Formalisasi Syariat tak ada Matinya".

²⁴ Din Syamsuddin (Interview), "Dari Nekolim hingga Syariat Islam" (from Nekolim to Shari'a) in *Rakyat Merdeka*, 17 December 2006, www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/ediscetak/?pilih=lihat&id=28654. Din Syamsuddin (interview), Leiden, November 07, 2009.

As *rahmatan lil alamin*, Islam should be performed in accordance with social conditions. Moeslim Abdurrahman argued that *Perda Shari'a* has marginalized and victimized women as most *Perda* regulate women's attitudes, performance, and behavior. Instead of empowering and helping women, *Perda* oppresses women.²⁵ Moreover, Abdurrahman said that the *Perda* does not intend to target rich people. It has nothing to do with corruption. All it does is place poor people as the objects of law. Abdurrahman concludes that *Perda Shari'a* discriminates against women, poor people and minorities.²⁶

Another important point is highlighted by Syafiq Mughni, chairman of Muhammadiyah Surabaya. He said that a decision to wear the *jilbab* (veil) should be based on free will. Mughni's position is a response to the chief of Surabaya Police's who issued a policy stating that police women should wear the *jilbab*.²⁷ Nashir and Salim note that the *Perda Sharia* implemented in the province of Aceh and other Indonesian districts force Muslim women to wear the *jilbab*.²⁸ Mughni's commentary is a criticism of *Perda Shari'a*, and the enforced wearing of the *jilbab* in particular.

C. The emergence of moderate-progressive institutions

As explained in previous chapters, the rapid emergence of radical Islam groups during the period of democratic transition in Indonesia alerted Muhammadiyah scholars to movements threatening democracy. As far as these Muhammadiyah scholars are concerned, these radical Islamic ideas intend to change the political system to a theocracy. Consequently, some Muhammadiyah scholars established institutions such as the Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization (PSAP), the Ma'arif Institute, the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (JIMM), the Center for Dialog and Cooperation among Civilizations (CDCC), the International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), and the Center for Moderate Muslim (CMM). These institutions were

²⁵ See Moeslim Abdurrahman, "Korban Pertama dari Penerapan Syariat Islam adalah Perempuan" (the First Victim of the Implementation of Shari'a is Women) in www.Islamlib.com/id/article

²⁶ See Moeslim Abdurrahman, "Korban Pertama dari Penerapan Syariat Islam adalah Perempuan" (the First Victim of the Implementation of Shari'a is Women).

²⁷ "Muhammadiyah Dukung Imbauan Polda Berjilbab" (Muhammadiyah Support the Call for Police Women to wear Headscarf) in www.surabaya.detik.com/read/2009/03/04

²⁸ See Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (The Islam Syariat Movement). See also Arskal Salim, *Challenging the Secular State*.

established during democratic transition. Although each of them has a different emphasis, they all attempt to counter radical Islamic ideas and strengthen democracy.

Some Muhammadiyah scholars such as Syafii Maarif, Din Syamsuddin, Amin Abdullah, Sukidi Mulyadi, and Pramono Tantowi established the Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization (PSAP). PSAP is concerned with the future of democracy. PSAP attempts to counter the influence of these radical groups and disseminate a moderate Islamic view. This institution published the journal of *Tanwir* and various books promoting Islamic values which support democracy. In addition, PSAP conducted seminars and public discussions to raise awareness about democracy.²⁹ To a certain extent, PSAP can be seen as the counter movement to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) which criticizes democracy and calls for an Islamic caliphate.

Syafii Maarif, a former chairperson of Muhammadiyah, is seen as an icon of the progressive Muhammadiyah scholar's movement and Muhammadiyah scholars founded an institute named after him – the Maarif Institute – in 2002. The main purpose of this organization is to strengthen the moderate element of the Muhammadiyah movement.³⁰ Like PSAP, the Maarif Institute publishes a journal and books and conducts workshops and seminars. An interesting part of the organization's program is the annual Maarif Award which is given to a person who is actively involved in social transformation at the grass roots level. The criteria for this award include the active promotion of tolerance, pluralism, democracy, peace, and human rights at a local level. In 2007, the Maarif Institute gave the award to both Arianto Sangaji, an activist who established peace initiatives in Poso, and Jacklevyn Frits Manuputy, a priest who pioneered cooperation between religions in Ambon.³¹ As Syafii Maarif explains, this award aims to appreciate figures or activists who support and strengthen democracy.³² Maarif said that religious radicalism is one of the surface phenomena of crisis faced by Indonesia.

A couple of months after its foundation, Maarif Institute activists such as Moeslim Abdurrahman, the first executive director of the Maarif Institute, and Ahmad Syafii Maarif, founded the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (JIMM). This

²⁹ See <http://psap.or.id/component/content/article/34-psap/45-profile-psap.pdf>

³⁰ See <http://maarifinstitute.org/content/view/79/79/lang,indonesian/>

³¹ See http://maarifinstitute.org/downloads/tor_maarif_award_2008.pdf

³² see Ahmad Syafii Maarif in

http://maarifinstitute.org/downloads/Mencari_Pemimpin_Lokal_Visioner.pdf

organization was created as an umbrella organization for the various young Muhammadiyah intellectual movements. Abdurrahman believes that there is huge potential for young Muhammadiyah thinkers. Moreover, he believes that the presence of a platform supporting their intellectual development is one of the factors enabling the emergence of young intellectual movements within Muhammadiyah. JIMM was launched at a national workshop in 2003 attended by young Muhammadiyah activists and its founders. In addition, similar workshops were also conducted in Yogyakarta, Malang, Surabaya, and Solo.³³

Soon after its launch, JIMM activists made a big impact on the mass media with their articles in the column 'Opinion'. JIMM saw that religious radicalism is an impact of neo-Liberalism, and they offer up the concept of democracy as a guarantee of economic justice.³⁴ Although this organization has a different emphasis than the PSAP and the Maarif Institute, they too believe that religious radicalism should be reduced as it threatens the future of democracy.

Din Syamsuddin, a chairperson of Muhammadiyah (2005-now), together with Abdul Mu'ti, a chairman of Pemuda Muhammadiyah (2002-2006), established the Center for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilizations (CDCC). The purpose of CDCC is to create mutual understanding among different religions, cultures, nations, and civilizations. Although it was founded later than the PSAP, the Maarif Institute, and JIMM, CDCC has similar concerns. Syamsuddin believes that a lack of dialogue is the biggest causal factor behind religious radicalism. He calls for dialogue among western governments and the Muslim world. Mutual understanding can be created if people communicate their beliefs, ideology, and culture.³⁵

Another organization which should be explored here is the International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP). It was founded by Syafii Anwar, a former member of the Muhammadiyah board. After finishing his doctoral degree in Australia, he established ICIP. This organization attempts to create harmonious relationships among various

³³ "Kelahirannya tanpa Deklarasi" (Its Birth without Declaration) (Republika 21 Nopember 2003) in Pradana Boy (ed) *Era Baru Gerakan Muhammadiyah* (the New Era of Muhammadiyah Movement) (Malang: UMM Press, 2008), p.207-209.

³⁴ Moeslim Abdurrahman "Tiga Pilar JIMM" (Three Foundations of JIMM) (Republika, 21 Nopember 2003) in Pradana Boy (ed) *Era Baru Gerakan Muhammadiyah* (the New Era of Muhammadiyah Movement) (Malang: UMM Press, 2008) p.195-199.

³⁵ Din Syamsuddin (Interview), 7 November 2009.

cultures and religious groups. ICIP was established in Jakarta in July 2003. The establishment process involved intellectuals and specialists on Islam and pluralism from Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philippines. The main objective of ICIP is to build a network of progressive-moderate Muslim activists and intellectuals, particularly in Southeast Asia.³⁶ Religious intolerance during the post-New Order era in Indonesia was one of the reasons why Syafii Anwar founded ICIP.

Bombings carried out by radical Islamist activists in the early 2000s urged Indonesian Ulama, mainly from NU and Muhammadiyah, to respond. In 2003, the Jakarta International Conference (JIC) was held. This conference aimed to build a network among Ulama in Southeast Asia to stem the spread of radical Islam's ideas, and promote moderate Islam. The participants of the conference agreed to create the Center for Moderate Muslims (CMM). The institution is organized and maintained by Muhammadiyah and NU leaders and activists. It also involves Muslim scholars from other Southeast Asian countries. Syafii Maarif, Tarmizi Taher, and Hasyim Muzadi are the leaders of the organization.³⁷ CMM has links to Muhammadiyah's and NU's *pesantren* and mosques. Since this non-governmental organization (NGO) was mainly created by Muhammadiyah and NU leaders it facilitates cooperation with these two Islamic organizations in establishing CMM's mission.³⁸

The establishment of these NGOs demonstrates Muhammadiyah scholars' concern for the future of democracy. Through these institutions, the scholars played significant role in countering radical Islam ideas and actions. The presence of the institutions enabled them to promote moderate and progressive Islam. Each organization has different emphasis supporting these scholars to formulate and focus on particular subjects.

D. Salafiyya, Muhammadiyah scholars, and Secularism

The role of Muhammadiyah scholars in countering radical Islam movement is controversial. Many Muslim activists questioned these scholars commitment to Islam, and particularly the commitment of Syafii Maarif. Husain Umar, a chairman of *Dewan*

³⁶ See www.icipglobal.org

³⁷ See www.cmm.or.id

³⁸ See www.cmm.or.id.

Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), is disappointed with Maarif's view that often criticized the proponents of *shari'a*.³⁹ Criticism came not only from outside of Muhammadiyah, but from inside the organization too. Adian Husaini, a board member of Muhammadiyah between 2005 and 2010, criticized Syafii Maarif's opinion regarding *shari'a*. He said that Maarif does not know about *shari'a*, because he is a professor of history. Furthermore, Muhammadiyah critics of Maarif see him as a secular scholar who is intent on separating religion and the state.⁴⁰

It is undeniable that all of these Muhammadiyah scholars are the followers of Salafiyya. This can be traced to their commitment to Muhammadiyah's mission. Din Syamsuddin states that from foundation until the present day, Muhammadiyah has been part of the Salafi movement. Syamsuddin recognizes that Ibnu Taymiyyah, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, and Rasyid Rida's thoughts significantly influence Muhammadiyah.⁴¹

For instance, Syafii Maarif had been a supporter of an Islamic state. He was influenced by Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Quthb's view. He changed his mind while studying for his doctoral degree at Chicago University. His encounter with Fazlurrahman's thought made him aware that an Islamic state is not the goal of Islam. He argues that Islamic values such as justice, harmony, prosperity, education, and supremacy of law are the important points that must be established by Muslims.⁴²

It is worth noting that early the Salafiyya developed by Muhammad Abduh was progressive. Abduh used Salafiyya to support his ideas about reformation and modernization of the Muslim world. His modern thought accommodated western ideas and mixed them with Islamic teachings.⁴³ His pupil, Ali Abdul Raziq, is even more liberal than Abduh. Raziq states that Islam never commands Muslims to establish an

³⁹ See Adian Husaini, "Ada Apa dengan Syafii Maarif" (What is Wrong with Syafii Maarif) in www.swaramuslim.com/more.php?id=5243_0_1_644_M

⁴⁰ See Adian Husaini, "Ada Apa dengan Syafii Maarif" (What is Wrong with Syafii Maarif).

⁴¹ Din Syamsuddin, "Pemikiran Islam Muhammadiyah dalam Pusaran Zaman" (Islamic Thought of Muhammadiyah in Contemporary World) in Syamsul Hidayat (ed), *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons terhadap Liberalisasi Islam* (Muhammadiyah's Thought: Respond to Liberalization of Islam) (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2005), p.viii-ix.

⁴² See Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Titik-titik Kisar di Perjalananku: Otobiografi Ahmad Syafii Maarif* (Autobiography of Ahmad Syafii Maarif) (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2006).

⁴³ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.116.

Islamic state. In Raziq's view, a secular system separating religion and state is the best model to develop.⁴⁴ The views of Abduh and Raziq indicate that the Salafi movement has the potential to support a democratic and secular system. In general, Salafiyya has close relations with radical movements supporting the Islamic state and fighting against western culture. Rashid Rida, another of Abduh's pupils, is one of the Salafi scholars fighting for an Islamic state (caliphate). Unlike his teacher, Rida has always maintained distance from western thoughts, particularly in this latest period of his life.⁴⁵ Even more critical of western ideas than Rida is Hasan al-Bana, the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin. Sayid Quthb, one of the most prominent figures of Ikhwanul Muslimin, also criticized western culture. Quthb believes that the western political and economic system is not proper for Muslims. He believes that an Islamic system is the best model and should be implemented by Muslim rulers.⁴⁶ The Wahhabi movement which emerged in the 18th century and was strengthened at the beginning of the 20th century reinforces the harsh nature of Salafi. Wahhabi followers have destroyed historic sites and Islamic groups which they believe 'pollute' their idea of pure Islam. They are not tolerant to Sufism, philosophical Islamic Theology, and a rational interpretation of Islam. This Wahhabi movement condemns these things as heretic. Furthermore, they attack and oppress others. Wahhabi followers believe that Islam should be understood literally from the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet Muhammad.⁴⁷

Muhammadiyah also experiences dynamic development. Various forms of Salafi – puritan, moderate, and progressive-liberal – can all be found in Muhammadiyah.⁴⁸ Syafii Maarif, Moeslim Abdurrahman, Amin Abdullah, Amien Rais, Din Syamsuddin, Syafii Anwar, and Haedar Nashir are categorized as progressive and moderate Muhammadiyah scholars. To a certain extent, they are able to negotiate Salafiyya

⁴⁴ Sami Zubaidi, *Islam and Secularization* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), p.446-447. it is also available in www.brill.nl

⁴⁵ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, p.231.

⁴⁶ See Khaled Abou el-Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: Harper Sanfransisco, 2005). See also Gilles Kepel, *The Roots of Radical Islam* (London: Saqi, 2005).

⁴⁷ See Madawi al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation* (New York: Cambridge University, 2007). See also DeLong Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). Also Khaled Abou el-Fadl, *The Great Theft*.

⁴⁸ See Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam: the Conservative-Progressive Debate within Muhammadiyah*, (Unpublished Thesis, Canberra: Australian National University, 2007).

doctrines with secularism. Haedar Nashir states that Muhammadiyah is fundamentally reformist Salafi in nature, an important factor that enables Muhammadiyah to accommodate a secular system such as democracy and *Pancasila*.⁴⁹ In line with Nashir, Saiful Mujani found that Muhammadiyah positively correlates with democracy. He said that Muhammadiyah leaders have close connections with modern western social and political thought. This enables leaders to accommodate and promote a secular system to Muhammadiyah members.⁵⁰ However, Nashir and Mujani's findings should be examined further, because there are also some Muhammadiyah scholars who promote the formalization of *Shari'a*.

To some extent, it is true that all those Muhammadiyah scholars who reject the amendment of article 29 UUD 1945 and criticize *Perda Shari'a* have a close connection to modern thought. Most of them graduated from western universities. Syafii Maarif and Amien Rais are alumni of Chicago University. Moeslim Abdurrahman pursued his masters and doctoral degree at the University of Illinois. Din Syamsuddin and Syafiq Mughni graduated from the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), and so forth. This is, of course, not the only factor which influences their stance. As Haedar Nashir mentions, Muhammadiyah adheres to reformist Salafiyya, and it is different to the ideological Salafiyya which fights to establish an Islamic state and *shari'a*. In Nashir's view, reformist Salafi tends to modernize and reform Islamic interpretations in order to be compatible with modernity and social necessity.⁵¹

Syafii Maarif always emphasizes the public benefit when interpreting Islamic doctrines. He is well known as a proponent of *Pancasila* and an opponent of an Islamic state, as well as *Perda Shari'a*. He believes that *Pancasila* is the most proper frame for relations between religions and the state. This demonstrates that he crosses beyond literal interpretations of Qur'anic verses mentioning the obligation to implement *shari'a* within

⁴⁹ Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (The Islam Syariat Movement), p.476-477.

⁵⁰ Saiful Mujani, *Muslim Demokrat: Islam, Budaya Demokrasi, dan Partisipasi Politik di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* (Democrat Muslims: Islam, the Culture of Democracy, and Political Participation in Indonesia after the New Order) (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2007) p.174.

⁵¹ Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat* (The Islam Syariat Movement), p.476.

the state. Maarif reinterprets such verses and contextualizes them based on the contemporary social-political context.⁵²

Like Maarif, Moeslim Abdurrahman highlights the need for social hermeneutics and critical theories. He said that to understand the message of a verse of the *Qur'an*, it is necessary to comprehend the social and political context of a society. He believes that the *Qur'an* underlines the importance of helping oppressed people. Abdurrahman sees *shari'a* not as an instrument to support individual piousness, but as a message to establish justice and human rights.⁵³

Amin Abdullah also promoted hermeneutics as a way to understand Qur'anic verses. When he was chairman of *Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam* (the Institution of Reform and Development of Islamic Thought) together with other Muhammadiyah scholars such as Munir Mul Khan, Hamim Ilyas, and Syamsul Anwar, Abdullah published a book introducing the idea of progressive interpretation of the *Qur'an* in the context of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.⁵⁴ The book caused a heated debate among Muhammadiyah leaders and members. In addition, Abdullah proposed that *Bayani*, *Burhani*, and *Irfani* should be adopted by Muhammadiyah as the new method for understanding the *Qur'an* and producing *fatwas*.⁵⁵ Of these methods, *Burhani* is the one associated with hermeneutics.

While Amien Rais may be as liberal as Maarif, Abdurrahman or Abdullah, he too emphasizes the need to consider the contemporary social and political context when interpreting texts. Rais has shown himself to be concerned with issues of democracy and neo-liberalism. For example, he reinterprets the meaning of *tauhid* as the rejection of

⁵² Syafii Anwar, "Syafii Maarif, Bung Hatta, dan Deformalisasi Syariat" (Syafii Maarif, Bung Hatta, and Deformalization of Shari'a) in Abdul Rahim Ghazali, *Muhammadiyah dan Politik Islam Inklusif: 70 Tahun Ahmad Syafii Maarif* (Muhammadiyah and the Inclusive Islamic Politic: 70th years Ahmad Syafii Maarif) (Jakarta: Maarif Institute), p.31-48.

⁵³ Moeslim Abdurrahman, *Islam Sebagai Kritik Sosial* (Islam as Social Critique) (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2003), p.192-193.

⁵⁴ Syamsul Anwar, "Fatwa, Purification and Dynamization: a Study of Tarjih in Muhammadiyah" in *Journal of Islamic Law and Society*, vol. 12, afl.1, 2005, p.38-39.

⁵⁵ See Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam*.

authoritarianism. He offered a new concept of *tauhid* in order to fight against the Suharto regime in 1998.⁵⁶

Observing these Muhammadiyah scholars, it seems that modern thought and methodology are the main factors influencing their progressiveness. Not all reformist Salafi have such progressive ideas. In terms of the Muhammadiyah board, for example, there are some scholars who support the amendment of article 29 of UUD 1945 and the implementation of *Perda Shari'a*, while a handful of Muhammadiyah scholars have made clear their position and ideas in terms of supporting democracy and a secular system.

Conclusion

The position of a number of Muhammadiyah scholars' is clear – they reject the amendment of article 29 of UUD 1945 and the implementation of *Perda Shari'a*. They lobbied parliament not to change the original text of article 29. Moreover, they affected public opinion regarding the impact of the amendment of article 29 on the future of modern Indonesia and democracy. To some extent, their attempts have been successful. This is demonstrated by the statement of the MPR chairman making clear that MPR preferred not to amend article 29 because of a request by leading Muhammadiyah figures and other scholars. Similar actions by Muhammadiyah scholars have taken place criticizing *Perda Shari'a*. These Muhammadiyah scholars are making clear attempts to influence the government and Indonesian Muslims to review and reject the notion of *Perda Shari'a*. The establishment of moderate-progressive institutions is another example of action taken by these scholars to counter radical Islamic ideas. These Muhammadiyah scholars negotiate Salafiyya doctrines with democracy and use modern social and political theories to reinterpret the *Qur'an*.

⁵⁶ Tamrin, *Gagasan Demokrasi Amien Rais dalam Teori Politik Islam Indonesia* (Amin Rais' Ideas of Democracy in the Theory of Islamic Politic of Indonesia) (Padang: Andalas University Press, 2006), P.77-88

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Salafi is not a monolithic movement. Wicktorowicz states that among the variants of Salafi there are *jihadi* Salafi and reformist Salafi.¹ Like Wicktorowicz, Azra divides Salafi into peaceful Salafi and radical Salafi.² Furthermore, Khaled Abou El Fadl describes the historical development of Salafi from its origins under the leadership of Jamaluddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, both of whom are categorized as modernist Salafi, to the radical Sayyid Qutb.³ The explanation from Wicktorowicz, Azra, and Abou El Fadl shows that Salafi can be either liberal-reformist or radical-islamist. However, recent trends in the development of Salafi indicate that radical-islamist Salafi is becoming the dominant force. Even Bunyan Wahib found that most Salafi movements in Indonesia are influenced by Wahhabiyya.⁴ Wahhabi is a puritan and radical variant of Salafi. FPI, FKAWJ, and MMI are influenced predominantly by Wahhabi. Some of the prominent figures of these organizations have connection with Wahhabi leaders in Saudi Arabia.⁵

It is clear that Muhammadiyah is part of the Salafi movement. Din Syamsuddin clearly mentioned that Ibnu Taymiyyah, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab are Salafi figures that inspire Muhammadiyah ideas and movements.⁶ In this regard, Haedar Nashir classifies Muhammadiyah as reformist Salafi.

¹ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Salafi Movement Violence and The Fragmentation of Community" in Mariam Cooke and Bruce B Lawrence (eds), *Muslims Network from Hajj to Hip Hop* (USA: The University of Carolina Press, 2005), p.209.

² Azyumardi Azra, *Indonesia, Islam and Democracy: Dynamic in a Global Context* (Jakarta: Solistice, The Asia Foundation and ICIP, 2006), p.169.

³ See Khaled Abou el-Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (Newyork: Harper Sanfransisco, 2007).

⁴ Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, *Gerakan Dakwah Salafi Pasca Laskar Jihad*. The paper is available at www.ern.pendis.depag.go.id/DokPdf/ern-iv-02 (2009), p.7.

⁵ Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and Quest for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia* (New York: Ithaca, 2006).

⁶ Din Syamsuddin, "Pemikiran Islam Muhammadiyah dalam Pusaran Zaman" (Islamic Thought of Muhammadiyah in Contemporary World) in Syamsul Hidayat (ed), *Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons terhadap Liberalisasi Islam* (Muhammadiyah's Thought: Respond to Liberalization of Islam) (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2005), p.viii-ix.

Nashir states that reformist Salafi does not intend to establish an Islamic state and resist western culture. Moreover, Nashir explains that reformist Salafi attempts to modernize Islamic doctrines in order to be compatible with modernity and democracy.⁷ Nashir tries to differentiate between Muhammadiyah and radical Salafi movements such as FPI, MMI, and FKAWJ. In my opinion, Nashir's argumentation is weak. As far as I am concerned, various characteristics of Salafi can be found in Muhammadiyah. Not only reformist Salafi, but also radical-islamist Salafi has grown within Muhammadiyah. This can be observed from critical responses to leading Muhammadiyah scholars who fight for pluralism and democracy. As Pradana Boy points out, there is heated debate between the progressive and conservative wings of Muhammadiyah.⁸ It is possible to find some Muhammadiyah activists who are interested in radical Islamic movements, and some who are even actively involved with these radical organizations.

However, the role of those Muhammadiyah scholars who are fighting against radical Islamic movements is significant. These scholars are categorized as the progressive wing of Muhammadiyah. Some of them play an important role in the cultural dimension, while others are active in parliament. These scholars have two different approaches to tackling radical Islamic movements and achieving their goals – the political approach and the cultural approach. These Muhammadiyah scholars responded to the amendment of article 29 of UUD 1945 and the implementation of *Perda Shari'a*. They convinced Indonesian Muslims not to support the application of state *shari'a*. *Shari'a* is defined by these scholars as path to reaching God. Moreover, they state that *Shari'a* has a broad scope related to divine teachings. *Shari'a* is not defined merely as Islamic law, and they argue that views claiming *Shari'a* to be Islamic law has actually reduced *Shari'a*.

Their actions in countering radical Islamic ideas are based on their vision of democracy. According to them, democracy requires the separation of religion and the state. This does not mean that religions should be marginalized or banned. The spirit and ethics of religions are taken as the sources and inspiration for the development of the

⁷ See Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia* (The Islam Syariat Movement: Reproduction of Ideological Salafiyah in Indonesia) (Jakarta: PSAP Muhammadiyah, 2007).

⁸ Pradana Boy, *In Defense of Pure Islam: the Conservative-Progressive Debate within Muhammadiyah* (Unpublished Thesis, Canberra: Australian National University, 2007), p.100-111.

state. Furthermore, they believe that democracy would guarantee all religious followers the right to freely practice their religion.

The responses of some Muhammadiyah scholars to the amendment of article 29 UUD 1945 and *Perda Shari'a*, indicate that in the context of understanding *Shari'a*, modern thought and methodology are the main factors affecting their progressive thinking. Not all reformist Salafis develop the idea of democracy and secularism. Within Muhammadiyah itself, there are several figures who oppose these progressive views. Mujani's view that Muhammadiyah is positively correlated with democracy should be examined further. His argument suggesting that the close connection of many Muhammadiyah leaders with modern thought is the main factor in Muhammadiyah promoting democracy is not entirely correct. In my view, it is right that certain modern thoughts would influence Muhammadiyah scholars in understanding the proper relationship between religions and the state, however, the way they interpret *Shari'a* is another important factor that is not mentioned by Mujani. Besides mustering modern thoughts, these Muhammadiyah scholars – including Syafii Maarif, Din Syamsudin, Munir Mul Khan, Amien Rais, Moeslim Abdurrahman, Amin Abdullah, Syafiq Mugni, and Syafii Anwar – are also deeply in touch with Islamic doctrines. In addition, they place more emphasis on Islamic values than Islamic symbols, and so they have no problems in terms of contextualization. These Muhammadiyah scholars reinterpret *Shari'a* through modern social and political theories. This is not the case with the conservative wing of Muhammadiyah and radical-islamist Salafi. They have been exposed to these modern theories as well, but they criticize and reject them and they are unable to contextualize or participate in dialogue on Islam within modernity. Furthermore, they believe that the modern thought created by western scholars will destroy the Muslim faith.

For these Muhammadiyah scholars, the increase of radical Islamic movements in the democratic transition of post-New Order Indonesia became a threat to democratization. They saw that the obvious tasks faced by Indonesian Muslims are to fight against the ideas of theocracy that will threaten the future of Democracy in the country. Their critical response to the amendment of article 29 of UUD 1945 and *Perda Shari'a* indicates their commitment to establishing democracy. Furthermore, the

establishment of study centers and NGOs, such as Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization (PSAP), the Maarif Institute, Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals Network (JIMM), Al-Maun Institute, International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), and the Center for Moderate Muslims (CMM) can be seen as these scholars' strategy for fighting against radical Islamic movements, and a way of preventing other Muslims from sympathizing with radical Islam's agenda.

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Interview

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